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KNOWLEDGE ABOUT LEGAL SANCTIONS
Stephen McG. Bundy*
and Einer Elhauge **

For a system that likes to say that ignorance of its rules is no excuse, the legal system can be remarkably ambivalent about whether
the dissemination of knowledge about those rules is good or bad.
Lawyers have, in particular, been roundly condemned for providing
truthful information about the law that helps clients avoid punishment
for wrongdoing, exploit loopholes to engage in legal but undesirable
activity, recognize illegal activities that have low penalties or chances
of detection, and do better in litigation than they should have. 1 Ignorance of the law may be no excuse, but too much knowledge of the law
is, apparently, no virtue.
Often, however, knowledge or advice about the law is undeniably
desirable. How, then, do we sort out the good from the bad? The
legal profession's answer, at least as reflected in its rules governing the
provision of advice to a client, has been to presume that advice is
strongly desirable. Traditionally those rules have required lawyers to
provide their clients with complete and accurate advice about the law
and the legal system, unless the lawyer knows that the advice will simply further criminal or fraudulent conduct. 2
Many observers believe that this approach allows lawyers to give
far too much undesirable advice. One responsive intuition has been to
distinguish between functional categories of advice: for example, between advice that alters legal penalties (or sanctions) for a given
• Professor, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley. B.A. 1973,
Harvard; J.D. 1978, University of California at Berkeley.-Ed.
•• Professor, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley. Visiting Olin
Faculty Fellow, Yale Law School. B.A. 1982, J.D. 1986, Harvard.-Ed. The authors would like
to thank Meir Dan-Cohen, Geoffrey Hazard, Susan Koniak, Richard Lempert, John Leubsdorf,
Dan Rubinfeld, David Wilkins, and participants in the law-and-economics workshop at the University of Chicago for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and the John M. Olin Foundation and
the Boalt Hall Fund for financial support.
1. See, e.g.• JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80-87 (1949) (describing lawyers' tactics); MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 21-38
(1980) (same); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering. 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1085 (1988) (same).
2. Under the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992), this basic result flows
from Rule 2.1 ("[A] lawyer shall ... render candid advice.") and Rule 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent ....") See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3, 3.4 (1992)
(applying similar standards to litigation conduct).
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course of conduct and advice that informs clients about the scope and
level of conduct sanctions. 3 This perspective views litigation advice as
obstructionist, helping many individuals avoid sanctions for their past
conduct. It regards legal counseling more favorably because it helps
individuals conform their future conduct to the law.
This perspective has recently found more structured support in a
series of leading articles by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, which
offer economic models purporting to demonstrate a "sharp contrast"
between the social desirability of legal advice given before actors engage in primary conduct and legal advice during litigation. 4 If the
applicable legal sanctions are appropriately set, they argue, legal advice given to parties planning primary conduct will communicate
those sanctions and improve behavior. In contrast, they conclude that
legal advice during litigation is as likely to increase as to decrease the
information reaching tribunals about past conduct and therefore has
"questionable social value." 5 Accordingly, they put forth (without
quite advocating) various proposals that would in effect restrict litigation advice. 6
Another influential account, however, takes a precisely opposite
categorical approach, arguing that, while lawyers should be free to
provide advice in litigation consistent with generally accepted partisan
norms, a more restrictive standard should govern the provision of prelitigation advice. The first and most famous proponent of this view
was Lon Fuller, who strongly defended traditional standards gov3. This line has similarities to what William Simon has described as the regulatory approach
to legal ethics. See Simon, supra note 1, at 1085-87.
4. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information To Present in Litiga·
tion: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 597, 600, 614 (1989) [hereinaf·
ter Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information]; Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About
Contemplated Acts: The Decisions To Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of
Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123 (1988) [hereinafter Shaven, Legal Advice About Contem·
plated Acts]; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Legal Advice About Acts Already Commit·
ted, 10 INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 149, 158 (1990) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice
About Acts Already Committed] (drawing same distinction between advice provided before and
after conduct). Shaven draws another sharp distinction between advice that informs parties
about the scope or level of expected sanctions and advice that helps parties lower expected sane·
tions. Shavell, supra, at 136-39.
5. See Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Acts Already Committed, supra note 4, at 152;
Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 568-69, 597, 614.
6. See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 611-13 (propos·
ing narrowing confidentiality for litigation advice, requiring litigators to work for the state, or
not allowing a party to obtain litigation advice until they have been deposed); see also LLOYD L.
WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 147-64 (1977) (proposing judicial questioning of criminal defendants before they consult with their lawyers); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1055-57 (1975) (proposing a disclosure requirement as
long as no privilege is breached). Such proposals would effectively restrict the dissemination of
accurate knowledge about litigation sanctions by creating disincentives for the client to ask for it
or for the attorney to provide it, or by directly barring such dissemination until after depositions.
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erning the provision of legal advice in litigation but argued that in
counseling professional norms should not "grant any license to the
lawyer to participate as legal advisor in a line of conduct that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality."7 The view that different and
stricter standards should govern the provision of nonlitigation advice
retains wide support today. 8
An alternative line of analysis, most prominently developed by
William Simon, rejects both the above categorical approaches in favor
of a case-by-case approach. This line recognizes that advice of all
forms can contribute to undesirable consequences. Accordingly, Simon concludes that lawyers should deny advice - that is, refuse to
disseminate accurate information about the law - in any setting in
which such advice would not "promote justice."9 Simon, indeed, argues that the professional code should not only allow, but require, lawyers to exercise their discretionary judgment to deny advice in such
circumstances, with the possible exception of situations in which such
a professional canon would not be practically enforceable. 10 To the
extent such professional canons are to have meaningful effects on client behavior, which is their intent, they must effectively deny clients
access to truthful information about the law when it would lead to
undesirable consequences.
Recent developments in the regulation of lawyers demonstrate that
these categorical and noncategorical views have much more than theoretical interest. For example, the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 of the
7. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958). Given Fuller's evocative but vague formulation of the
limits on partisan advocacy, it is unclear whether he would have endorsed every detail of conventional advocacy norms. See id. (arguing that norms of partisanship should forbid an advocate
before a tribunal from seeking to "muddy the headwaters of decision"). But it is undeniable that
in his conception advocates should have substantially more freedom than counselors to provide
advice and assistance.
8. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1183 (1993) ("The ethical constraints on the actions a lawyer can take on
behalf of a client in an adversary proceeding are, and ought to be, different from the constraints
on a lawyer acting outside this context."); see also id. at 1183-85 (describing and defending the
distinction, and citing other scholars who support it).
9. Simon, supra note l, at 1089-90; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY 160-61 (1988) (maintaining that lawyers should "dissociate themselves from
projects that are immoral"). Simon divides his general thesis into two subtheses: (1) that lawyers should deny advice when the merits of a potential client's claims and goals are low relative
to other potential clients, Simon, supra note 1, at 1091-96; and (2) that lawyers should endeavor
"to achieve the most appropriate resolution in each case." Id. at 1096, 1096-113.
10. Simon, supra note 1, at 1084, 1132-33; see also id. at 1094, 1096 (stating that the law firm
has a "professional duty" to consider the relative merits of cases before taking them and that his
approach "requires" lawyers to try to reach the best result in each case). David Luban states
that he "has no objection" to incorporating such a requirement into professional canons but
ultimately declines to decide "whether a rule should require or merely permit a lawyer to forego
morally objectionable tactics." LUBAN, supra note 9, at 158.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure move beyond the "knowing assistance" framework to permit imposition of sanctions on a lawyer who
innocently files an action wholly lacking in merit if reasonable prefiling
inquiry would have disclosed that lack of merit. 11 This modification
clearly moves the standard for providing litigation advice closer to the
sort of contextual judgment envisioned by Simon.
More recently, the highly publicized series of enforcement proceedings brought by the Office of Thrift Supervision against the Kaye,
Scholer law firm featured versions of both categorical and situational
approaches. Thus, the Office of Thrift Supervision took the position
that lawyers giving compliance advice to federally chartered savings
and loans should practice the "whole law." This doctrine requires
lawyers to investigate client activities that appear to be of doubtful
legality and to refuse advice that would frustrate the purposes of regulation even when there is a serious technical argument that the clienes
conduct is not sanctionable. 12 Each of these requirements represents
an important step toward a contextual duty to deny advice. Kaye,
Scholer's abortive defense, in contrast, relied heavily on a categorical
distinction between litigation and nonlitigation advice. Because it had
been retained solely as litigation counsel, Kaye, Scholer argued, it was
wholly inappropriate, as a matter of both precedent and policy, to apply any ethical standard more demanding than the normal prohibition
on the presentation of frivolous or knowingly false legal and factual
claims. 13
Although generally limited to legal advice, the above analyses and
regulatory proposals bear on a more fundamental question: whether
and when knowledge about legal sanctions is desirable. They can thus
be linked to what might seem an unrelated line of reasoning: Meir
Dan-Cohen's pathbreaking jurisprudential analysis of "acoustic separation" in criminal law. 14 According to Dan-Cohen, criminal law
often transmits "conduct rules" to the public that are harsher than the
11. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. The former rule permitted the imposition of sanctions solely on a
showing of subjective "bad faith." See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee notes (1983
amendments). The new proposed amendments to the rule retain the rule of reason standard. See
FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (proposed amendments).
12. See Advice on How To Exploit Ethical Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTS' Weinstein Says,
56 BNA Banking Rep. (BNA) 616, 616 (Apr. 1, 1991) (reporting remarks of the General Coun·
sel of OTS), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABNK File.
13. Memorandum from Kaye, Scholer Executive Committee to All Kaye, Scholer Personnel
(Mar. 2, 1992), cited in Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1148 & n.4, 1156 [hereinafter Memorandum].
14. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation In
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). We stress that Dan-Cohen would not himself view
the topics of legal advice and acoustic separation as unrelated. Id. at 677 & n.148 (noting his
decision to leave unexplored the "complex and crucial role played by lawyers in regard to acoustic separation").
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actual "decision rules" used to adjudicate cases. This "selective transmission," which can only work under conditions of partial "acoustic
separation" between what adjudicators say and what the public hears,
prevents individuals from accurately assessing true legal sanctions.
But, Dan-Cohen demonstrates, such selective transmission can discourage bad behavior (because individuals think the law is harsh)
without producing the actual injustice that might arise from imposing
harsh legal standards.
Ironically, the dictum that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" itself illustrates selective transmission because, despite the widespread
dissemination of this maxim to the public, ignorance of the law often is
a permissible defense in actual adjudication. 15 The divergence between the maxim and reality is a form of selective transmission that
encourages individuals to learn the law, which improves their behavior, but avoids any injustice that would arise from punishing uninformed individuals for conduct they reasonably believed was lawful.
Although Dan-Cohen does not extend his analysis beyond the selective transmission of substantive criminal law defenses and limitations, it can readily be extended to other criminal law issues and to
civil law as well. Moreover, although Dan-Cohen does not discuss
curbs on legal advice as such, such curbs could, within his framework,
be regarded as a strategy of selective transmission. Indeed, because
legal advice tends to eliminate acoustic separation, such restrictions
may often be essential to implementing any selective transmission
strategy. But Dan-Cohen's analysis reminds us that restricting legal
advice is only one of many methods by which the legal regime might
try to diminish the legal knowledge possessed by the general public.
Against the backdrop of these analyses, we aim to offer a more
systematic account of whether and when knowledge about legal sanctions, and restrictions on the dissemination or use of such knowledge,
are socially desirable. Because it bears critically on our conclusions,
we begin in Part I by developing the point that, even in an optimal
sanctioning regime, sanctions are inevitably imprecise. Moreover, this
imprecision takes multiple forms involving similar trade-offs. The
scope of conduct subject to sanctions will necessarily be over- and underinclusive, including some desirable behavior while failing to include
some undesirable behavior. And the level of sanctions will necessarily
result in some overdeterrence of desirable behavior and some underdeterrence of undesirable behavior.
Accordingly, even when sanctions are optimal, accurate advice
15. Id. at 645-48.
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about legal sanctions has many adverse effects. However, we conclude
in Part II that, absent a skewed distribution of legal ignorance, the
overall behavioral consequences of advice about sanctions will tend to
be desirable if society bas set sanctions to optimize behavior. We also
conclude that this proposition applies just as readily to advice about
sanctions for litigation conduct as to advice about sanctions for primary conduct. In reaching these conclusions, we reject various categorical distinctions developed in Shavell's analysis of primary conduct
advice. We also reject any categorical distinction between the social
desirability of advice given prior to litigation and that given during
litigation, whether that distinction favors advice about primary conduct, as in the work of Kaplow and Shavell, or litigation advice, as in
the work of Fuller and his followers.
We then apply our analysis in Part III to the question whether a
noncategorical or case-by-case approach should be used to restrict
"undesirable advice" - that is, advice that, in the given situation, will
lead to undesirable results. We conclude that fairness arguments
might sometimes justify legal advice about sanctions even where such
advice has adverse behavioral consequences. More fundamentally, we
conclude that Simon's noncategorical approach fails to recognize that,
like any other rule, a rule banning undesirable advice will raise
overdeterrence problems. Because resolution of whether advice was
undesirable will often be inaccurate, such a ban will deter lawyers
from giving some advice that would have had desirable results. Moreover, this overdeterrence is likely to be especially severe for clients
who are poor, unsophisticated, or have one-shot or low-stakes claims.
The total mix of over- and underdeterrence might well be worse than
under a categorical approach.
Nor is the question necessarily different in kind if Simon's proposed rule is taken to define only a social or ethical norm without legal
force. Although detection and application may well be easier under a
social or ethical norm, it will never be perfect, and whatever means are
used to resolve questions about the norm's application will also be susceptible to error and, via social sanctions or the internalization of
moral norms, over- and underdeterrence. Further, we show that,
through the crime-fraud exception, current law actually uses a noncategorical metastandard to trigger either a categorical or noncategorical
approach. Such a triggering approach, we argue, can optimize overand underdeterrence better than any unitary rule or standard could.
Finally, we use our analysis in Part IV to generalize and extend
Dan-Cohen's analysis to a more global issue: whether and when the
law should restrict the dissemination of legal knowledge, whether by
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restricting legal advice or through other means, based on the topic of
the knowledge communicated. Under some circumstances, such selective transmission about imperfect sanctions may lead to desirable
behavior. But, even when sanctions are nonoptimal, selective transmission can also produce undesirable behavior. We identify the circumstances that will make selective transmission behaviorally
desirable or undesirable. We further argue that, given these circumstances, no grounds exist to conclude that advice or knowledge about
legal sanctions is in general behaviorally undesirable even when sanctions, if fully known, would not optimize behavior. The desirability of
such advice depends instead on evidence about what particular overor underestimations of legal sanctions unadvised or ignorant parties
would make given the topic at hand. Moreover, many selec_tive transmission strategies are subject to serious fairness objections. When, as
often, selective transmission has ambiguous behavioral effects, fairness
concerns will normally dictate rejecting such strategies. Even when
selective transmission clearly improves behavior, fairness objections
will in some cases provide a basis for forgoing the strategy.
I.

THE UNAVOIDABLE TRADE-OFF IN OPTIMAL LEGAL
SANCTIONS

Legal sanctions are inevitably imperfect. This, by itself, may seem
obvious. Perfection is not to be had by mere mortals. And perhaps it
is found less often in law than in other human endeavors. But the
point here is deeper. Even behaviorally optimal sanctions will be imprecise because punishing (and thus deterring) undesirable behavior
can only be accomplished at the price of punishing (and thus deterring) some desirable behavior. At some point, efforts to ameliorate the
underpunishment (and underdeterrence) of undesirable behavior will
raise the punishment (and overdeterrence) of desirable behavior to unacceptable levels. Hence, behaviorally optimal sanction regimes can,
even in theory, achieve no greater perfection than reaching the optimal
trade-off between the underdeterrence of undesirable behavior and the
overdeterrence of desirable behavior.
Sanctioning regimes can be expected to pursue multiple strategies
to achieve this behavioral optimization. Adjusting the level of sanctions is one strategy; adjusting the burden of proof or the scope of
sanctionable conduct are other strategies. The pursuit of these multiple strategies means that we cannot assume that the communication of
accurate information about the probability and magnitude of even optimal sanctions will improve behavior. Nor can we assume that all
legal (or unsanctionable) conduct is desirable under an optimal regime
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or that lowering the actual level of optimal sanctions (for past or contemplated conduct) is undesirable.
All of this deserves particular emphasis here because leading analyses of legal advice have adopted contrary premises. In his seminal
economic analysis of legal counseling, for example, Shavell assumed
that all unsanctionable conduct is desirable; further, he indirectly assumed that a regime of appropriate sanctions would deter all undesirable conduct but never deter desirable conduct. 16 In later writings,
Kaplow and Shaven used this assumed baseline of appropriate sanctions to draw their sharp contrast between legal counseling advice and
litigation advice. 17 Simon makes a similar error in failing to recognize
that the proposals he makes for reducing undesirable advice will inevitably deter and reduce desirable advice as well. 18
A.

The Root Problem of Incomplete Information

Whatever criteria society uses to distinguish desirable from undesirable conduct, 19 it faces the problem that any regime of legal sanctions will be imprecise because of incomplete information. Perfect
sanctioning would require complete information supplied by reliable
witnesses. 20 But not all information can be observed. For example,
even a reliable witness to the conduct in controversy usually cannot
directly observe the actor's state of mind or internal physical condition. Even when physically possible, direct observation may involve
prohibitive costs. Many acts must be observed, and reliable witnesses
are expensive, in large part because a cumbersome system of secondary sanctions is often necessary to ensure their reliability. 21
16. For a discussion of these and other articles, see infra section II.A.
17. For further discussion, see infra section II.A.
18. For further discussion, see infra section IIl.B.
19. Our analysis makes no assumption about what these criteria should be. In particular, we
do not choose between the welfarist view that conduct is undesirable if and only if it causes harm
exceeding the actor's gain, Shaven, supra note 4, at 128-29, and the view that at least some
conduct is undesirable because it is intrinsically wrong rather than because it fails a utilitarian
calculus. Cf. Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289, 293-94 (J. Ruland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (questioning
whether an act's utility to a criminal offender should be taken into account in determining the
social value of her conduct).
20. A reliable witness is physically and mentally competent, skilled in observation, knowledgeable about the subject matter being observed, and disinterested.
21. Massive videotaping of all human activity might avoid some of the problems raised by
secondary sanctioning systems, but it would entail its own enormous financial costs. It would
undoubtedly also require human monitors to process the resulting videotapes, which in turn
requires some secondary sanctioning system to ensure the reliability of videotape monitors. Of
course, it would involve other enormous costs in terms of desirable conduct deterred, invasion of
privacy, and general spiritual impoverishment, as the text following this footnote indicates. The
patent grotesqueness of the suggestion is itself evidence that a society may find that other goods
provide ample compensation for the imprecision of its sanctioning system.
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But some of the most significant costs of collecting information are
not financial. Surveillance is often intrinsically harmful insofar as it
invades privacy or restricts personal liberty. Moreover, the observation needed to distinguish desirable from undesirable conduct can itself have the perverse effect of deterring desirable conduct. For
example, observing the industrial design process may detect defective
designs but discourage technical innovation (which might even improve safety) because of the risk that trade secrets would be disclosed.
Close observation of family interaction may detect child abuse but destroy the intimacy and spontaneity that are among the principal goods
of family life. At some point, concerns about these nonfinancial costs
of surveillance justify placing limits, such as evidentiary privileges, on
the ability of reliable witnesses to observe or report disputed conduct.
In short, obtaining reliable, complete information is not only unfeasible but undesirable. Hence, even in an ideal legal system, tribunals would have incomplete information and thus encounter difficulty
determining with confidence whether a party has engaged in desirable
or undesirable conduct. In a more realistic world, tribunals will (even
if conscientious) also make errors in assessing the presented information or determining whether that information evidences undesirable
conduct under the existing law. 22 As a result, any legal regime will
make two kinds of errors: (1) failing to detect and punish some undesirable conduct; and (2) mistakenly punishing some desirable conduct.

B. The Three Basic Strategies for Optimizing Sanctions
Legal regimes employ various strategies to address this unavoidable imprecision. All, however, share a common problem. In the absence of the information necessary to distinguish with certainty
between desirable and undesirable conduct, the strategies can improve
the sanctioning and deterrence of undesirable conduct only at the cost
of sanctioning and deterring desirable conduct.
Before describing these strategies, it is worth addressing a basic
objection to the analysis: namely that not all conduct can be described
as desirable or undesirable. On many subjects, one might argue (and
we would agree), the proper stance of the legal regime is agnosticism
because individuals ought to have the autonomy to choose what they
want to do. There is, however, no difficulty in incorporating this observation into the general framework of this article. Where society
22. Sometimes the law will itself be vague in defining undesirable conduct. This effectively
gives tribunals lawmaking discretion to define undesirable conduct. Because they will sometimes
exercise this discretion in ways that deviate from what society would wish, this is another source
of legal error.
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values the freedom to do as one sees fit, any conduct individuals
choose is socially desirable in the sense used here because it would be
undesirable to deter individuals from choosing that conduct freely.
The legal regime can overdeter conduct that furthers autonomy as
well as conduct that furthers other social values.
1. Probabilistic Standards of Proof
One strategy for coping with uncertainty about what conduct is
undesirable is to have tribunals determine on a case-by-case basis the
probability that any given conduct was undesirable and then apply
sanctions when that probability exceeds a certain threshold. The legal
regime might, for example, define sanctionable conduct in terms of
characteristics that strongly correlate with desirability but could only
be reliably established with information that is impossible or too costly
to obtain.
For example, consider a rule that conditions sanctions on a party's
subjective good faith or intent. Under such a rule, adjudication of
whether the sanctionable conduct occurred must rest either on partial
information or on information of low reliability, such as the testimony
of the interested parties. Such adjudication will inevitably be rough
and uncertain, turning on the tribunal's extrapolation from existing
facts, its assessment of the witnesses' general propensity to lie or forget, their incentives and opportunity to lie in the particular case, and
so forth.
Tribunals might then accommodate the resulting uncertainty by
demanding only proof that the probability that the sanctionable conduct occurred meets a certain threshold. But the lower the probability
needed to punish undesirable conduct, the more that inaccurate adjudication will punish and deter desirable conduct. The higher the
probability, the more undesirable conduct will go unpunished and
underdeterred. An optimal probability will leave some desirable conduct punished and overdeterred and some undesirable conduct unpunished and underdeterred. 2 3
If the underdeterrence of undesirable conduct becomes worrisome,
the legal regime may lower the standard of proof to punish a greater
23. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410-15 (1973); see also Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal Prosecution of
Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain, 6 J.L. EcoN. & Ono. 189, 196-97 (1990). The appropriate
standard of proof, and the degree of over- and undersanctioning, will also depend on the levels of
litigation efforts by prosecutors, see id. at 189-90, 195-96, 200-01, and defendants. See Daniel L.
Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 308 (1987). But adjustments in, or based on, litigation efforts cannot eliminate the over- and undersanctioning problem.
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percentage of undesirable acts. The regime might, for example, require proof of negligence instead of scienter to establish fraud in soliciting proxies. Or the regime might change the standard of proof
indirectly (for example, by making a penalty civil instead of criminal)
or de facto rather than de jure (for example, by appointing judges who
are less sympathetic to defendants). All these types of adjustments
have been tried.
But any adjustment has trade-offs. A lower standard of proof
reduces underdeterrence but results in greater overdeterrence of desirable acts. Federal proxy regulation is illustrative: it now stands accused of reducing fraudulent proxy solicitations at the cost of
discouraging any communication among shareholders at all. 24 A
higher standard of proof, on the other hand, would ameliorate this
overdeterrence of desirable communications but would result in
greater underdeterrence of undesirable fraud.
2. Bright-Line Rules

Alternatively, the regime can define sanctionable conduct using
criteria that can be observed at a low cost and with a high degree of
confidence. 25 Instead of defining sanctionable conduct in terms of the
party's state of mind or other difficult to observe information, the regime may define it in terms that expressly disclaim reliance on state of
mind or allow proof based on easily observable features of the parties'
conduct. Examples include the objective theory of contract, the statute of frauds, various per se rules of liability under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 26 and the securities law prohibition on short-swing trading by statutory insiders whether or not they possess inside
24. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
539-40 (1990); John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC: Investor Protection Versus Market Efficiency, 29 J. FIN. EcoN. 241, 242, 271 (1991).
25. See Issac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976). For our purposes, the' key difference between rules
and standards is that the former rely on criteria that are easy to detect and apply whereas the
latter rely on criteria that are harder to detect and apply but are more closely correlated to the
desirability of the underlying conduct. Our definition thus parallels Ehrlich and Posner's but
differs from that used by others, who distinguish rules from standards based on whether their
content is set ex ante or ex post, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992), or whether they are simple or detailed. Id. at 560 n.4 (collecting sources). It seems to us that we often have ex ante standards (for example, the antitrust rule
of reason) as well as rules, and that we could have ex post versions of either. Similarly, rules can
be simple (speed limits) or complex (the tax code), and standards can be complex (15-factor
balancing tests) or simple (intentional battery).
26. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988)).
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information. 27
Detecting and punishing a violation of such bright-line rules will
be easier. 28 However, because such rules use criteria that correlate less
well with the desirability of the underlying conduct, the defined scope
of sanctionable conduct will be over- or underinclusive. 29 Either some
desirable conduct will be defined as sanctionable or some undesirable
conduct will not. In all likelihood, both will be true.
As compared with the first strategy, such a bright-line strategy
reduces uncertainty about the applicability of sanctions. 30 This strategy will therefore deter parties less from engaging in conduct that lies
outside the scope of the defined sanctionable conduct, but which might
be mistaken for it. But, to the extent that nonsanctionable conduct
under the bright-line rule encompasses undesirable as well as desirable
conduct, it is not clear that this lessening of deterrence will always be
socially beneficial. It may encourage "the proverbial 'bad man' to
'walk the line'" and thus exploit the resulting loopholes. 31
If the nonsanctionable conduct encompasses only desirable conduct, this lessened deterrence will, standing alone, be desirable. But
obtaining this social benefit has a cost: the deterrence of desirable conduct within the scope of sanctionable conduct will increase. There are
two reasons for this. First, punishment of desirable conduct within
the bright-line rule will be more certain than if a standard applied.
Second, if under the rule all nonsanctionable conduct is desirable, then
the rule must by definition include all undesirable acts. Designing
such a broad rule is almost sure to increase the rule's overinclusion of
desirable conduct.
3. Adjusting Penalties

The limitations of these two basic approaches to identifying sanctionable conduct also infect strategies that involve adjusting the level
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(l/) (1988)).
28. Moreover, individuals generally have more incentive to learn about, and thus have their
behavior influenced by, rules rather than standards for two reasons. First, individuals benefit
more from learning about rules because they offer more precise predictions of adjudication than
standards do. Second, to the extent rules are easier to learn, the cost of learning them will be
lower. Cf Kaplow, supra note 25, at 571-72 (using different definition of rules and standards).
This second factor, however, may not always hold. Learning the standard of negligence, for
example, seems easier and less costly than learning some provisions of the tax code.
29. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 1000 (1984); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 25, at 268;
Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1689-90; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 442 n.17 (1978) (recognizing that per se rules increase deterrence of desirable conduct).
30. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 25, at 261-64; Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1688-89.
31. Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1696.
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of actual penalties imposed. For example, a classic strategy for addressing the underdeterrence that results from imperfect information
is to increase the penalties imposed on those determined to engage in
undesirable conduct to reflect the probability that they might have escaped detection and punishment. 32 If, for example, only one-third of
antitrust violations are detected and punished, then trebling damages
will produce the same expected sanction as single damages and one
hundred percent detection and punishment. Assuming the actual penalties imposed can be set high enough, then, despite infrequent punishment, expected sanctions can outweigh the benefits of (and thus deter)
undesirable conduct.
An initial problem with this strategy is that the legal regime cannot
always set penalties high enough to eliminate underdeterrence. If the
frequency of detection and punishment is low, it may be impossible to
raise sanctions sufficiently to deter all undesirable conduct. Or the
level of sanctions required to eliminate underdeterrence may be disproportionate, unfair, cruel, beyond individual actors' wealth (so that
increasing sanctions yields no additional deterrent benefit), or, in the
case of extensive incarceration, too costly to administer. 33
A more general problem is that adjusting penalties can eliminate
underdeterrence only at the cost of increasing overdeterrence. 34 If,
given incomplete information, either the definition of sanctionable
conduct or the uncertainties of its adjudication often subject desirable
conduct to a risk of sanctions, then an increase in penalties to increase
deterrence of undesirable conduct will increase deterrence of desirable
conduct as well. 35 If, to avoid this result, the legal regime defines or
32. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325-26 (C.K. Ogden ed. &
Richard Hildreth trans., Harcourt Brace & Co. 1931) (1789); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 75-86 (2d ed. 1989); Gary s. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169, 183-85 (1968); Jeffrey S. Parker, The
Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 748-54 (1993) (collecting sources).
33. See Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 390-91
(1991); Reinier K. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 53, 56-57 (1986).
34. When economists describe "overdeterrence," they generally focus on the consumption of
social resources in preventing an offense, see Parker, supra note 32, at 757 n.46, such as the
expenditure of money on enforcement and punishment efforts. See id. at 750-53. Our focus,
however, will be on the deterrence of desirable behavior caused as an incident of efforts to deter
undesirable behavior.
35. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 29, at 995-97. Risk aversion will heighten the increased overdeterrence because high sanctions with a low probability of application impose
greater risk-bearing costs than low sanctions with a higher probability. See A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shaven, The Optimal Tradeojf Between the Probability and Magnitude ofFines, 69 AM.
EcoN. REV. 880 (1979). Of course, to the extent undesirable actors are also risk averse, risk
aversion will tend to reduce underdeterrence as well, but one might expect risk-bearing costs to
be more significant for desirable actors because their probability of punishment will be lower.
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adjudicates sanctionable conduct in a way that eliminates the punishment and deterrence of desirable conduct, then some undesirable conduct will also remain effectively unpunished and undeterred no matter
how much penalties are increased.
4. Individual Variation
The three recognized strategies also face problems of over- and undersanctioning that result from individual variation. Actors differ in
the benefits that they receive from the same conduct. In part, this
depends on whether they share any societal belief that a given act is
desirable or undesirable. It may also reflect the degree to which they
fear extralegal sanctions, such as divine punishment, the reproach of
conscience, or damage to their reputation, relationships, or future economic opportunities. 36 Actors also differ in their aversion to risk,
their perceptions of expected sanctions, and their ability and willingness to engage in rational calculation.
Such individual variation implies that a uniform schedule of expected sanctions will have different effects on different actors. Tribunals may attempt to adjust the actual sanctions imposed to
compensate for this variation. However, such ad hoc, individualized
efforts are likely to suffer from considerable imprecision because the
preferences, beliefs, and character traits involved are difficult to identify with confidence. 37 Where individualized sanction adjustments are
infeasible, the optimal expected sanctions will depend on the mix of
characteristics in the regulated population. Optimal sanctions will
have to minimize under- and oversanctioning given the population's
mix of characteristics and will thus underdeter undesirable acts or
overdeter desirable acts by persons who are unusual in any of the
above respects.
Actors vary not only in their response to legal regulation generally,
but also in their response to the choice of particular sanctioning strategies. Like most rational actor accounts of legal advice, our baseline
account assumes that actors are sanction optimizers. In deciding
whether to engage in regulated conduct, the sanction optimizer is a
Holmesian "bad man" 38 who considers only the actual level of ex36. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 32, at 755 & n.38 (collecting sources).
37. See generally Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 390 (discussing problems of adjusting
sanctions given individual variation); Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra
note 4, at 591-93.
38. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 171 (1921) (introducing the "bad man").
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pected legal sanctions and gives no independent weight to the fact that
the conduct is legally prohibited or required.
Other actors, however, may respond more to the sanctionability of
conduct than to the level of expected sanctions. Such actors, whom
we characterize as "law abiding," tend to comply with what they understand to be their legal obligations regardless of the level of expected
sanctions for failing to do so. 3 9 For example, if the law forbids certain
conduct outright, as does much of the criminal law, the law abider will
not engage in it no matter how low the expected sanction. If the law
permits conduct conditional on compensation for harm caused, as in
much of tort and contract law, the law abider will wish to pay the full
harm caused, whether or not he expects victims to sue or, if suit is
brought, to prevail.
A population of actors that is generally law abiding may influence
the mix of sanctioning strategies used by allowing the designers of the
regime to focus on the definition of sanctionability rather than on the
level of expected sanctions. Such a population, however, does not necessarily eliminate problems of over- and underdeterrence because, to
the extent that law abiders respond simply to the fact that conduct is
sanctionable, they will comply whether or not the definition of sanctionable conduct comports with social desirability. 40
C.

Compensatory Subsidies: A Fourth Basic Strategy?

In addition to the three recognized strategies, LP.L. Png has suggested an ingenious fourth strategy for coping with legal error: coupling an adjustment in penalties with a general subsidy for all actors. 41
Under this strategy, the legal regime would first increase penalties to
39. Law abidingness is independent of the content of the particular law and its congruence
with the actor's own views of morality. Rather it represents the actor's tendency to comply with
the law simply because it is the law. We need not take a position here on whether this tendency
is most appropriately viewed as a preference or as an expression of a kind of practical reason
different from economic maximization. See Lewis Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 670-72 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)).
40. If all actors were uniformly perfectly law abiding, then the regime could define conduct
as sanctionable strictly in accord with its social desirability. Disputes would still arise about
whether particular conduct was sanctionable because of good faith disagreements about the facts
and the scope of sanctionability, and some of those disputes would be resolved erroneously. But
imperfections in detection and adjudication resulting from the definition of sanctionability would
not lead to over- or underdeterrence because they would not figure in compliance decisions even
if known. Indeed, adjudication would have no deterrence function at all.
But of course not all actors are perfect law abiders. As long as a substantial set of actors
respond to expected sanctions rather than sanctionability, the regime that wishes to optimize
behavior is likely to adopt a definition of sanctionability that does not correspond precisely to
social desirability for all the reasons stated above.
41. See generally I.P.L. Png, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error, 6 INTL. REV. L. & EcON. 101 (1986). We are indebted to Dan Rubinfeld for pointing out
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offset underdeterrence until the difference between the expected penalties for undesirable and desirable conduct equals the harm from acting
undesirably. Then the legal regime would compensate for the expected penalties imposed on those acting desirably by giving all actors
(desirable and undesirable alike) a subsidy sufficient to offset this
overdeterrence effect. Png's strategy thus offers the promise of eliminating both the overdeterrence of desirable conduct and the underdeterrence of undesirable conduct despite the legal regime's imperfect
ability to distinguish them.
An example might help. Suppose we wish to deter negligent driving but not non-negligent driving. Suppose further that all accidents
give rise to claims and that, for a given accident, we can determine
with eighty percent accuracy whether or not the driver was negligent.
The actual penalty imposed on those judged to be negligent is $5000.
The expected penalty needed to deter all negligent driving is also
$5000. Under this regime, the expected penalty for driving negligently
is $4000 because twenty percent of those who drive negligently escape
punishment. The expected penalty for driving non-negligently is
$1000 because twenty percent of non-negligent drivers are mistakenly
found liable. Non-negligent driving would thus be overdeterred while
negligent driving would remain underdeterred. To compensate for the
underdeterrence, we might increase the penalty to $6250. That would
produce an expected penalty for negligent driving of $5000, sufficient
to eliminate underdeterrence. But the expected penalty for non-negligent driving would also increase, from $1000 to $1250, thus exacerbating overdeterrence. We seem to face a familiar trade-off.
Png's proposed solution to this dilemma has two elements. First,
he would increase the actual penalty even further until the difference
between the expected penalties for negligent and non-negligent driving
equals $5000. Here the necessary penalty would be $8333.33. That
would make the expected penalty for negligent driving equal to
$6666.66 and the expected penalty for non-negligent driving $1666.66.
Second, Png would give all drivers a subsidy of $1666.66 for driving.
The result is that the negligent driver would face an expected cost of
$5000 - the $6,666.66 expected penalty minus the $1666.66 subsidy
- which is enough to deter all negligent driving. The non-negligent
driver would face an expected cost of zero dollars, because the subsidy
offsets the expected penalty. Overdeterrence is thus also seemingly
eliminated, at least if one puts aside risk aversion.
that we have to address Png's strategy to establish our claim that the tradeoff between over- and
underdeterrence is inevitable.
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Professor Png's strategy is undeniably ingenious. Moreover, it
seems largely unappreciated in the legal literature. For several reasons, however, we do not believe that Png's strategy undermines our
general conclusion that no legal regime can ever avoid the trade-off
between over- and underdeterrence. 42
To begin with, Png's reasoning depends on an isolated analysis of a
single activity: driving. If the legal regime actually tried to pursue his
strategy across the board to curb all forms of undesirable conduct
without deterring desirable conduct, it would end up subsidizing all
activities. Subsidies would be required not just for driving, but for
skiing, flying, bus riding, or any other activity that might be penalized
if performed undesirably. The subsidization used to encourage these
socially optimal levels of driving will thus be undermined by the subsidization used to encourage socially optimal alternatives. What matters is not the absolute subsidy given to drivers but the relative subsidy
between alternative activities. Png's strategy does not explain how
subsidies can produce perfectly efficient choices between desirable and
undesirable versions of a given activity without skewing choices
among different desirable activities.
A related problem is that Png's analysis assumes parties should
internalize only the physical harm caused by their activities. 43 But
activities would also impose another cost under a legal regime that
employed his strategy: namely the cost of the subsidies that society
must supply to offset the difficulty of distinguishing between desirable
and undesirable versions of that activity. Let us call these costs imprecision costs. Because the level of difficulty involved in distinguishing
between desirable and undesirable acts differs for different types of activities, some activities will produce higher levels of imprecision costs
than others. Under Png's strategy, however, no activity would be
forced to internalize its imprecision costs. It is not clear why this
should be desirable. One might instead think that providing the incentives to encourage socially efficient choices between different activities
would require forcing every activity to include all the costs - including the imprecision costs - entailed by that activity. Implicitly, that
is precisely what a sanctioning regime without subsidies does.
Further, Png's analysis seems to assume that the collection and
distribution of taxes and subsidies is costless. Taxes, however, pro42. It should be noted that Png himself makes no such grandiose claims for his strategy: our
concern here is with the implications that might be drawn from his strategy.
43. Png, supra note 41, at 103. Png also assumes that the private benefit from any activity
equals the social benefit. If the private benefits are greater or less than the social benefits, his
conclusions may not follow.
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duce their own inefficient effects on behavior: for example, they deter
persons from engaging in those activities subject to taxation. There
are also substantial direct costs to enforcing taxes, and high costs
would have to be incurred to determine the size of subsidies, and who
should receive them, under Png's approach. It is far from clear that
the social inefficiencies produced by these taxes and subsidies would
not outweigh any increased efficiency in behavior.44
Finally, individual variation poses insurmountable problems for
Png's approach. To implement his approach, the legal regime must
calculate subsidies. This requires knowing how often each individual
engages in a particular activity, the probability he would have to pay
damages if he engages in a desirable version of that activity, and the
harm he would produce. 45 Because individuals differ on all these matters, any uniform schedule of subsidies will produce substantial overand undersanctioning. If the regime instead calculates different subsidies for each individual, it will need a secondary system of adjudication to determine how much of a subsidy each individual should
receive. This secondary system of adjudication would have to contend
with the same problems of imperfect information that plague the primary system of adjudication.

D. Conclusion
Given imperfect information, the best society can do is to design a
sanctioning regime that achieves the trade-off between undersanctioning undesirable conduct and oversanctioning desirable conduct that
seems the most optimal. The optimal compromise will most likely entail a combination of strategies: adjudicating or defining sanctionable
conduct in a way that renders some desirable conduct sanctionable
while reducing actual sanctions below the level that would be optimal
if all sanctionable conduct were undesirable. This solution will have
some adverse effects: optimal expected sanctions will still be high
enough to deter some desirable acts, but not high enough to deter all
44. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 22, 41·
45, 47 (1971) (observing that there is no a priori reason to believe the inefficiencies caused by
redistributive taxation are lower than the inefficiencies caused by redistributive regulation). If
the government (rather than private litigants) collects the extra penalties used under the Png
strategy, this added revenue may help offset the cost of the subsidies.
45. See Png, supra note 41, at 103. For the particular activity Png analyzed, driving, a convenient way of tying the subsidy amount to the activity level would be to subsidize gasoline.
Alternatively, this might be an argument for not raising the gasoline tax as high as would otherwise be necessary to offset driving externalities like pollution. But this strategy would not mea·
sure other activity risk factors, such as when and where the driving occurred, and collecting that
sort of data might violate privacy or itself deter desirable activity. See supra section I.A. In any
event, most human activities lack any similar convenient way of metering activity levels.
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undesirable conduct.46 Given the unavoidable trade-off, however, the
success of any sanctioning regime cannot fairly be judged by whether
it wholly eliminates over- or undersanctioning. Rather, it must be
judged by whether it minimizes the total adverse consequences of undersanctioning undesirable conduct and oversanctioning desirable
conduct.
Although this article stresses behavioral measures, such as overand underdeterrence, our conclusion does not depend on the measure
used to evaluate the consequences of under- or oversanctioning. In
particular, our conclusion is consistent with the view that punishing
innocent defendants, failing to exact retribution from wrongdoers, or
inadequately compensating deserving plaintiffs is wrong because it is
inherently unjust rather than because of its behavioral consequences.
Under such nonbehavioralist views, the sanctioning regime would simply aim to minimize the total injustice resulting from over- and undersanctioning. The key is not the measure of value but the recognition
that, under any measure, sanctioning undesirable conduct must be
traded off against sanctioning desirable conduct.

II.

THE DESIRABILITY OF ADVICE ABOUT SANCTIONS AND THE
CATEGORICAL APPROACH

As we describe in more detail below, the desirability oflegal advice
is sometimes viewed as depending on the category of function it performs. One important view distinguishes between advice that simply
informs persons of the scope and level of expected sanctions and advice that assists parties in altering expected sanctions. The most desirable category of advice is usually considered to be a~vice that merely
informs clients about whether certain conduct is illegal. Advice that
also informs clients about the magnitude of legal penalties and the
probability they will be imposed is viewed with more suspicion because legal penalties or enforcement may be insufficient. But the general attitude toward such advice is still favorable, on the assumption
that the object of reform should not be the advice but rather the laws
that provide insufficient penalties and enforcement. With more appro46. Steven Shaven demonstrates that setting the level of sanctions for nonproduction of evidence in this manner may be optimal when the tribunal cannot be sure whether a party is failing
to produce evidence. See Steven Shaven, Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive To Provide Evidence to Legal Tribunals, 9 INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 3, 4-S (1989). But the point is clearly more
general. Whenever tribunals cannot distinguish with certainty between desirable and undesirable
conduct, then - whether the conduct occurs inside or outside litigation - the sanctioning regime can minimize the total disvalue of undersanctioning undesirable conduct and oversanctioning desirable conduct by adjusting not only the level of sanctions, but also, through adjudication
or definition, the scope of conduct subject to sanctions.
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priate expected penalties, it is felt, such advice would desirably lead
persons to comply with the law.
Under this initial categorical approach, both of the above forms of
advice - which simply communicate the existing scope and level of
expected legal penalties - are viewed more favorably than advice that
gives persons knowledge about how to alter expected legal penalties.
This latter type of advice, it is felt, helps persons evade their legal
responsibilities. It does so either by altering the information created
about contemplated conduct or by altering (typically in litigation) the
information revealed about past conduct.
A version of the categorical distinction between advice that informs persons about expected sanctions and advice that alters those
sanctions appears to underlie what William Simon has described as the
regulatory approach to legal ethics.47 Under the regulatory approach,
lawyers should distill and transmit information but should not manipulate that information to further their clients' goals. Recently, an economic basis for such an approach - along with a more precise outline
of its contours - has been spelled out by Kaplow and Shavell in a
series of articles.
The point is of more than academic interest. Such a categorical
distinction may underlie a current rule of professional ethics. Most
significantly, Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule l.2{d) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. 48

The comment to. the rule explains:
There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a
crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.... [T]he lawyer is
required to avoid furthering the [wrongful] purpose, for example, by suggesting how it might be concealed.4 9

On its face, Rule 1.2 thus seems to make a categorical distinction between advice that merely informs a client about expected sanctions
and advice that lowers those expected sanctions. so There are thus live
47. Simon, supra note 1, at 1085-87.
48. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1992).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1992).
50. Unlike the Model Rules, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not (at least
not expressly) draw such a distinction in its crime-fraud exception. See MODEL CODE OF PRO•
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980) ("[A] lawyer shall not ... [c]ounsel or assist
his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."). But the relevant Ethical Considerations under the Code appear to do so. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
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legal issues about whether such a distinction should be recognized
within the crime-fraud exception and potential legal issues about
whether the law should extend such a distinction beyond the crimefraud area.
In practice, the posited distinction may break down. If a lawyer
can tell the party the legal consequences (including the magnitude and
probability of sanctions) that attend each of a number of possible
courses of conduct that have the same undesirable purpose, the client
will have no difficulty choosing the one that results in the lowest expected sanction. 51 But our focus here is less on practical objections to
possible proposals than on the basic question whether the distinction,
if definable, is justifiable.
Another implication of a categorical approach that disfavors advice that assists a party in altering expected sanctions is that litigation
advice is particularly suspect; this, of course, is Kaplow and Shavell's
conclusion. An alternate categorical approach to advice, recently
characterized by David Wilkins as "the single most important contextual distinction in legal ethics," 52 however, takes a precisely opposite
tack, viewing litigation advice as categorically more desirable than primary conduct advice. In litigation, this approach argues, advice is reflected primarily in conduct taking place before the tribunal, where
both parties have legal advice. In contrast, advice about primary conduct takes place in private and frequently only the actor has legal advice. The private and unilateral quality of conduct advice makes it
unusually dangerous and justifies subjecting it to greater restrictions.
This claimed categorical distinction also underlies an important
current debate in professional ethics, a debate that was highlighted in
the Kaye, Scholer case. Kaye, Scholer represented Lincoln Savings in
connection with an audit by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Following its seizure of Lincoln, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the
Board's successor, brought a widely publicized enforcement proceeding against Kaye, Scholer, charging that it had violated its obligations
to both Lincoln and the Board, that those violations had contributed
to delays in closing Lincoln, and that Kaye, Scholer was liable for
BILITY EC 7-5 (1980) ("A lawyer should never... counsel his client on how to violate the law
and avoid punishment therefor."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-5 n.14 (1980) (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 281 (1952):
"There is a sharp distinction, of course, between advising what can lawfully be done and advising
how unlawful acts can be done in a way to avoid conviction."). See generally CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.3.2 (1986).
51. For a description of how some lawyers accomplish this result, see KENNETH MANN,
DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 109-11, 115-20
(1985) (describing compliance advice with respect to government subpoenas).
52. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1155.
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losses resulting from those delays. While some of the government's
claims may well have been consistent with traditional ethical prohibitions on knowingly assisting in client crime or fraud, others could be
read as imposing more demanding obligations. sJ
Kaye, Scholer ultimately settled the claims against it for $41 million. What is of interest is that the central element of the firm's defense to the charge was that, "with respect to virtually all of the
matters at issue, [Kaye, Scholer] was retained as litigation counsel by
Lincoln."s4 Relying on an opinion from distinguished ethics expert
Geoffrey Hazard, Kaye, Scholer argued that, given the categorical status of its legal work, it would be both unprecedented and unwise to
impose upon it any of the more demanding standards of conduct implied in the OTS Notice of Charges.ss Subsequent observers of the
case, while they have criticized Kaye, Scholer's reliance on the distinction between advice about litigation and advice about primary conduct
given the facts of the case, largely appear to accept the distinction.s 6
We begin our investigation of these conflicting categorical approaches by describing in section II.A the Kaplow and Shavell models
and by taking a critical look at the assumptions needed to reach their
conclusions. We then demonstrate in section II.B that, with more realistic assumptions, one reaches very different - and often precisely
opposite - conclusions about categories of legal counseling. Finally,
in section II.C we tum to categorical distinctions between the social
desirability of advice in litigation and advice about primary conduct.
We reject both Kaplow and Shavell's claim that litigation advice is
categorically inferior to advice about primary conduct and the claim
by Fuller, Wilkins, and Hazard that the reverse is true.
A.

The Kap/ow and Shavell Models

In their seminal work in the area, s7 Kaplow and Shavell use economic models of legal advice to reach five basic conclusions about
legal advice. First, "when advice is sought regarding whether acts are
53. For discussion, see Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye. Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers
To Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions. 66 U.S.C. L. REV. 1019, 1025-32 (1993)
(outlining tensions between traditional view of lawyers' ethics and OTS's view); Wilkins, supra
note 8, at 1157-59 (discussing some OTS claims arguably in tension with traditional view).
54. Memorandum, supra note 13.
55. See Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C Hazard, Jr., reprinted in THE ATIORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFrER KAYE, SCHOLER 381, 396 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992) [hereinafter THE ATIORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP].
56. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1183 ("[A]s a general matter, Kaye Scholer's position seems
uncontroversial.").
57. See Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4; Shaven, supra note

4.
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sanctionable, and the advice is definitive, then advice can lead only to
desirable changes in behavior." 58 This conclusion is based on the observation that, to the extent that it alters behavior, advice about sanctionability will have one of two consequences. Either it will lead
parties to commit unsanctionable acts that, without advice, they
would have thought sanctionable, or it will lead them to avoid sanctionable acts that, without advice, they would have thought unsanctionable. 59 Either of those behavioral changes is assumed to be
socially desirable. 60
Kaplow and Shavell's second and third conclusions concern legal
counseling that informs clients about the level of expected legal sanctions. The second conclusion is that "the provision of legal advice
about the probability and magnitude of sanctions will lead to socially
desirable changes in behavior if the probability and magnitude of sanctions are set so that expected sanctions equal the harm that results
from acts." 61 The third conclusion is that "the desirability of the effect of advice about contemplated acts is ambiguous when the legal
system's sanctions do not properly reflect harm caused." 62 Both these
conclusions are framed in terms of whether expected sanctions equal
the "harm" caused by the conduct because Shavell's initial model
adopted the utilitarian assumption that an act is socially undesirable if
and only if the harm done exceeds the party's gain. 63 But Shavell
stresses that he uses this utilitarian assumption merely to allow him to
describe an undesirable category of acts, and that his analysis applies
equally if one uses other criteria for defining undesirable conduct. 64 In
their subsequent work, Kaplow and Shaven generalize this conclusion
to assert that advice about the level of expected legal sanctions will
tend to be socially beneficial if that level is set "appropriately." 65
These generally favorable conclusions about advice that informs
clients about the scope or level of expected sanctions contrast with
Kaplow and Shavell's negative conclusions about advice that alters
those sanctions. Their fourth conclusion is that, "when advice helps
to lower (rather than only to inform about) the probability or magni58. Shaven, supra note 4, at 138 (emphasis added); see also id. at 129.
59. Id. at 129.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 135; see also id. at 138; Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra
note 4, at 597.
62. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597 n.77; see also
Shavell, supra note 4, at 138-39.
63. Shavell, supra note 4, at 128-29.
64. Id. at 129 n.16.
65. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597.
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tude of sanctions, advice can lead only to the commission of undesirable acts and is therefore undesirable. " 66 (Their models do not
consider advice that helps raise the level of expected sanctions for
other parties.)
Advice in litigation, which helps alter sanctions for past conduct,
is also viewed as dubious. Kaplow and Shaven observe that evidentiary sanctions are often insufficient to force the revelation of all information in a client's possession. 67 They then assume, on the premise
that this assumption alters the extent but not the nature of their conclusions, that lawyers exercise perfect control over the client's information. 68 Thus, in their model, litigation advice has only the effect of
improving the client's selection of information to present to the tribunal from this controlled set of information. Litigation advice should
accordingly increase the favorable information presented to the tribunal and decrease the unfavorable information presented. 69 Kaplow
and Shavell therefore conclude that litigation advice lowers the expected sanctions of those who receive it and has an ambiguous effect
on the accuracy of adjudication and the behavior of individuals. 70
Hence their fifth conclusion is that litigation advice, or more generally
advice about how to challenge or defend past primary conduct, has
"questionable social value."71
This chain of reasoning leads to their overall conclusion that there
exists a sharp contrast between litigation advice and legal counseling
provided before contemplated primary conduct:
There is a general reason to believe that legal advice provided when individuals are deciding how to act will tend to be socially beneficial. Such
advice informs individuals before they act about the sanctions the legal
system actually employs. As a result, individuals will be led to behave
desirably if the level of sanctions is set appropriately....
The socially desirable character of legal advice offered ex ante stands
in sharp contrast to the questionable social value of advice offered during
66. Shavell, supra note 4, at 139 (emphasis added); see also id. at 137 ("The provision oflegal
advice that lowers the probability or magnitude of sanctions is socially undesirable because it can
lead only to an increased number of socially undesirable acts.").
67. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 571-75. The reasonableness of this assumption is, of course, confirmed by scholarly and nonscholarly studies of the
litigation process. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 1, at 85-86 (witnesses frequently lie and get away
with it); Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About
the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219, 225 (many civil cases conclude
with relevant and material information not disclosed).
68. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 576.
69. Id. at 568, 577, 581, 595.
70. Id. at 568-69, 581, 586, 596, 603, 614.
71. Id. at 597, 614; see also Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Acts Already Committed,
supra note 4, at 149.
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litigation. 72

We will return to the litigation advice side of this asserted sharp contrast in section II.C. For now, let us reexamine the premises underlying the conclusion that advice that merely informs clients about the
scope and level of expected sanctions is, if those sanctions are "set
appropriately," desirable.
The first conclusion regarding advice about the scope of sanctions
(that is, advice about sanctionability) rests on the premises that causing parties to commit unsanctionable acts, or to avoid sanctionable
acts, is by definition desirable. 73 With the benefit of the analysis in
Part I, it is evident that this first premise is equivalent to assuming that
the law is never underinclusive: any conduct outside the realm of
sanctionability is assumed desirable. Kaplow and Shavell's second
premise is equivalent to assuming the law is never overinclusive or
overdeterring: any conduct that would be deterred by knowledge of
its sanctionability is assumed undesirable. Neither of these assumptions seems very plausible.
The premise underlying the conclusions regarding advice about the
level of expected sanctions (that is, advice about the probability and
magnitude of sanctions) is that the "appropriate" level of expected
sanctions equals the harm the conduct causes. We do not wish here to
quarrel with the utilitarian assumption that the sole measure of social
desirability is whether the private benefit exceeds the harm to others;
after all, Kaplow and Shaven state that they adopt this assumption
solely to define a class of undesirable conduct. 74 Rather the key point
for present purposes is that, under this definition of undesirability,
Kaplow and Shavell's notion of the "appropriate" level of expected
sanctions is perfect in the sense that it will deter every undesirable act
and no desirable acts. 75 Because an undesirable act is (by definition)
one that causes more harm to others than gain to the actor, expected
sanctions equal to that harm will always deter it. Because a desirable
act is (by definition) one that causes more gain to the actor than harm
72. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 614:
Skepticism about the value of legal advice in litigation is suggested by the manner in
which it differs from advice provided before people act. The latter type of advice will lead
individuals to behave more in accord with the law. Advice provided in litigation, after
individuals have acted, has no similar general tendency.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
74. See supra text accompanying note 64.
75. The same can be said for Kaplow and Shavell's definition of the appropriate level of strict
liability sanctions in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of
Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 306 (1992), which leads them to the conclusion that
advice about appropriate strict liability sanctions always improves behavior. See id. at 309.
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to others, expected sanctions equal to that harm will never deter it.
Under a view that defines undesirable conduct differently, this is
equivalent to assuming that the regime of "appropriate" sanctions can
perfectly distinguish between desirable and undesirable conduct.
It is thus not surprising that, under this assumption, advice that
informs parties about the level of appropriately set expected sanctions
is always desirable. Because such sanctions perfectly deter undesirable
conduct without deterring desirable conduct, no ill can follow from
disseminating information about such sanctions. Any ill effects that
actually flowed from advice would thus seem to be the fault of the law
that "inappropriately" set the level of expected sanctions. Nor is it
surprising that advice that alters the appropriate level of expected
sanctions would receive unfavorable reviews. Tampering with perfection can never constitute an improvement.
But, given our analysis in Part I, the implicit assumption of perfection is unrealistic. Because even optimal sanctions cannot perfectly
distinguish between desirable and undesirable conduct, it makes no
sense to judge advice using a measure of appropriate sanctions that
can never be achieved. And the analysis of advice under such an optimal but imperfect regime leads, as we will see in the next section, to
quite different conclusions about the desirability of such advice.
B.

The Effects of Advice About Optimal but Imperfect Sanctions

Legal advice about the sanctions applicable to contemplated conduct can affect behavior in one of two ways. First, it can correct misperceptions actors may have about expected sanctions. Second, it can
help actors affect the level of expected sanctions. Because of the various inevitable imperfections in any sanctioning regime, either form of
advice about legal sanctions will have many adverse effects, even when
sanctions are optimal. Our analysis suggests, however, that their social desirability is not, overall, that different. Moreover, we conclude
that, despite these adverse effects, the overall behavioral consequences
of either form of advice will (absent a skewed distribution of legal ignorance) tend to be socially desirable if society has set sanctions to
optimize behavior.
1. Advice that Corrects Misperceptions About Expected Sanctions

Legal advice can correct misperceptions about expected sanctions
in a variety of ways. It can inform actors that they have over- or
underestimated the magnitude of sanctions. They might, for example,
learn that, if a certain tax deduction they are thinking of taking is
disallowed, the penalties are higher or lower than they thought. Ad-
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vice might also inform actors that they have over- or underestimated
the probability that sanctions will be imposed. They might, for example, learn that the odds of being audited are lower or higher than they
believed. Finally, advice might inform actors that they have over- or
underestimated the scope of conduct subject to sanctions. The deductions they can legally take might, for example, be broader or narrower
than they thought.
If the sanctioning regime could distinguish perfectly between desirable and undesirable conduct (and thus never sanctioned or deterred
desirable conduct) and if it could also adjust expected sanctions perfectly (so that expected sanctions always exceeded the gain derived
from undesirable acts), then advice that corrected misperceptions
about expected sanctions would always be socially desirable because it
would never discourage desirable acts or encourage undesirable acts.
But, as we established in Part I, such a perfect sanctioning regime is
both implausible and undesirable. Thus even ·a sanctioning regime
that optimizes behavior will underdeter some undesirable conduct and
overdeter some desirable conduct. Moreover, such an optimal regime
is likely to manifest not only over- and underdeterrence in the level of
expected sanctions, but also over- and underinclusion in the scope of
conduct subject to sanctions.
Correcting misperceptions of either the scope or level of expected
sanctions will thus have mixed behavioral consequences. It increases
the likelihood that actors will engage in any conduct - desirable or
undesirable - when they learn that expected sanctions for that conduct are lower than they thought. It reduces the likelihood of that
conduct when actors learn that expected sanctions are higher than
they thought. 7 6 Some of the errors unadvised actors might make are
socially undesirable: they might overestimate expected sanctions for
desirable conduct or underestimate expected sanctions for undesirable
conduct. Correcting these errors will have desirable effects because it
increases the likelihood that actors will commit desirable acts or forgo
undesirable acts. Other errors are socially desirable: unadvised parties might overestimate expected sanctions for undesirable conduct or
underestimate expected sanctions for desirable conduct. 77 Correcting
these errors will have undesirable effects because it increases the likelihood that actors will commit undesirable acts or forgo desirable acts.
76. Parties with advice may also change their desirable or undesirable behavior because they
are risk averse and discover that, although expected sanctions are at the level they expected, they
have incorrectly estimated the magnitude of the sanction imposed in the event of detection.
77. We assess the extent to which these errors may be undesirable on fairness grounds infra
in Part III.A. We limit our analysis here to the desirability of the behavioral consequences that
flow from these errors and from the advice that corrects them.
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Kaplow and Shaven are thus wrong, we think, to conclude that
advice about sanctionability is always desirable. 78 Because optimizing
behavior also involves adjusting the scope of rules that define sanctionable conduct, advice about the scope of rules will often have undesirable effects. Such advice might, for example, teach clients how to
exploit tax loopholes. Or such advice might discourage clients from
productive endeavors because they learn of unduly harsh tax consequences. Similarly, Kaplow and Shaven are wrong, we think, to conclude that advice about the level of appropriately set expected
sanctions is always desirable. Because even the optimal levels of expected sanctions will over- and underdeter, disseminating accurate information about them will often lead to undesirable consequences.
Nor, once one admits the possibility of imprecision in sanctions, does
there seem any justification for a categorical distinction between advice about the scope of sanctionable conduct and advice about the
level of expected sanctions.
The fact that advice about the scope or level of optimal expected
sanctions has undesirable as well as desirable consequences does not,
however, mean that on balance such advice has ambiguous social
value. If society sets sanctions to optimize behavior when those sanctions are known by actors, then, unless the distribution of unadvised
ignorance is skewed, the net behavioral consequences of advice that
corrects misperceptions about expected sanctions will tend to be socially desirable. The reason is that an optimal sanctioning regime by
definition minimizes the adverse consequences of underdeterring undesirable conduct and overdeterring desirable conduct. Accordingly,
any actual increase or decrease from the optimal level in expected
sanctions for potentially sanctionable actions would cause more harm
in terms of reduced desirable or increased undesirable actions than
good in terms of reduced undesirable or increased desirable actions. 79
Generally, over- or underestimations of optimal expected sanctions
should disturb this social balance in the same way as actual increases
or decreases that move expected sanctions away from optimal levels.
Advice that corrects such over- and underestimations should accordingly have net beneficial behavioral effects.
Of course, one might assume that the legal regime would adjust
actual sanctions to account for any increased legal ignorance resulting
from a general restriction on legal advice. The relevant comparison
would then be between (1) a regime with advice and those sanctions
78. See supra text and notes accompanying notes 58-60.
79. "Harm" and "good" here are measured under whatever scale - deterrence, compensation, retribution, and so forth - is used to derive the optimal sanctioning tradeoff.
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that would be optimal for advised individuals, and (2) a regime with
the restriction on advice and those sanctions that would be optimal for
less-advised individuals. Sanction adjustments for unadvised ignorance would not, however, alter our general conclusion about the overall desirability of advice unless that unadvised ignorance was
systematically skewed. Indeed, in some respects sanction adjustments
for unadvised ignorance highlight a consideration which strengthens
our general conclusion about the overall desirability of providing advice. Namely, unadvised individuals are likely to have more varied
and disparate estimates of expected sanctions than advised individuals.
This greater individual variation for unadvised actors will increase the
over- and undersanctioning of any sanctioning scheme, no matter how
much sanctions are adjusted. 80 The effect of advice in reducing this
individual variation thus bolsters our general conclusion that advice
about the level of expected sanctions tends to have desirable behavioral effects.
Our general conclusion does, however, have two important exceptions worth emphasizing. First, and most obviously, if sanctions have
not been set to optimize behavior, it will be ambiguous whether the net
behavioral consequences of correcting over- and underestimations will
be socially desirable. Second, misperceptions can be socially desirable
if those who would act undesirably are systematically more prone
without advice to overestimate expected sanctions (or less prone to
underestimate expected sanctions) than those who would act desirably. Absent such a systemic divergence in unadvised perceptions,
however, misperceptions of expected sanctions that optimize behavior
will have net behavioral consequences that are negative. Legal advice
that corrects those misperceptions will accordingly have net behavioral consequences that tend to be socially desirable, even though
many specific behavioral consequences are undesirable.
2. Advice That Alters the Level of Expected Sanctions
Legal advice given before conduct can help actors alter the level of
expected sanctions by advising them how to engage in the contemplated conduct in ways that lower the probability or magnitude of
sanctions. Advice can help parties create or produce information suggesting that the contemplated conduct is not sanctionable. Advice
can, for example, also help parties prevent the creation or disclosure of
information suggesting that the conduct is sanctionable.
80. See supra section l.B.4. We are indebted to David Friedman of the University of Chicago
for this point.
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Such advice will have undesirable consequences to the extent it
lowers expected sanctions for undesirable conduct. For example, a
lawyer may advise a party who is claiming an unwarranted deduction
to lower the chance of detection by claiming that deduction on a line
of the return less likely to raise suspicion. Or a lawyer may lower the
chances of a business being found liable for price fixing by advising a
business not to commit to writing any price discussions with its
competitor.
But in a regime in which sanctions deter optimally, rather than
perfectly, some desirable conduct will also face positive expected sanctions. Accordingly, advice that lowers expected sanctions can also
benefit persons whose proposed conduct is desirable: legal advice can
help sheep, as well as wolves, to dress in sheep's clothing. For example, advice may inform a party who plans to take a valid tax deduction
that a particular means of recording her expenses will minimize the
chances her deduction will mistakenly be denied. Or a business that
plans to engage in a legal exchange of industry-wide aggregate price
information may be advised to make those exchanges only in writing
so that unjustified allegations of secret price fixing are harder to make.
These observations establish that the overall effect of advice that
lowers expected sanctions is not necessarily harmful in general. Might
such advice be generally beneficial? A first step in answering this question is to observe that actors receiving advice that enables them to
lower their expected sanctions for engaging in conduct do not act in
isolation. Other actors, even those lacking legal advice, can sometimes
take steps ex ante that increase the level of expected sanctions for such
conduct. And if those other actors have legal advice, the first actor
will face an even greater increase in expected sanctions, which will
affect both desirable and undesirable conduct. In such cases, one cannot assess in isolation the effect of ex ante advice that allows an actor
to create or produce favorable information about contemplated conduct and to prevent the creation or disclosure of unfavorable information. The net effect of such advice depends on whether other persons
with an interest in the matter can also influence, ex ante, the creation
or disclosure of information that affects the conduct's expected
sanctions.
When, for example, both parties to a contract receive advice about
how best to evidence their intent in the written contract, this bilateral
advice should generally improve the ability of tribunals to distinguish
the desirability of the parties' conduct. The reasons for this conclusion parallel those underlying the similar conclusion we drew in a
prior article about bilateral litigation advice that influences the infor-
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mation presented about past conduct. Such bilateral litigation advice,
we there concluded, should generally improve both the quality and
quantity of information reaching the tribunal by enabling each party
to screen out irrelevant information, produce more jointly available
information, identify more information in investigation, and decrease
unlawful withholding and suppression by its opponent. 81 The net result, we argued, is that, as compared with the situation in which both
parties lacked advice, sanctions would generally decrease for desirable
conduct and increase for undesirable conduct. 82
In contractual settings, ex ante bilateral advice that influences the
information that would reach the tribunal if contemplated conduct
were to become the subject of litigation should have similar effects.
Consider two important goals of contract law: ensuring an accurately
priced transaction by encouraging the identification and disclosure of
relevant information and, in long-term contracts, reducing opportunistic behavior. In a negotiation for the sale of an asset when neither
party is represented by counsel, one might expect that the parties'
written agreement (if any) would describe the essential elements of the
transaction less accurately, specify the information relevant to accurate pricing less clearly, and contain less effective prohibitions on opportunistic behavior than an agreement negotiated by lawyers.
Consequently, a tribunal required to resolve a dispute about the transaction is more likely to make errors both in failing to sanction undesirable conduct and in sanctioning desirable conduct.
If only the seller were represented, one would instead expect that
legal advice about how to conduct the negotiations and to word the
agreement would tend to lower the seller's expected sanctions for failing to disclose information or for opportunistic behavior. When both
buyer and seller have attorneys, however, lawyers will prepare and
negotiate written warranties, covenants, and other provisions whose
principal ex ante effect is to increase expected sanctions for misrepresentation and strategic behavior. 83 One can therefore expect contracts
negotiated by parties with legal advice generally to be more accurately
81. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 335-61.
82. Id. at 381-82.
83. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Gilson's account suggests that, when business lawyers are on both
sides of the transaction, they typically participate heavily in negotiations over provisions
designed to increase the seller's expected sanctions for nondisclosure in the form of representations, warranties, and indemnification agreements. Id. at 267-87. They also help draft agreements to control strategic behavior in long-term transactions. Id. at 265-67 (discussing eamout
formulas).
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priced and less vulnerable to opportunistic behavior than transactions
negotiated by unrepresented parties.
Suppose, however, that a severe imbalance exists in the quality of
advice received, that other affected parties lack advice altogether, or
that other affected parties cannot observe an actor's conduct or influence the information created and preserved about that conduct. The
paradigm cases here might be a form contract of adhesion drafted by
lawyers for a large corporation for use in consumer transactions or a
decision by taxpayer to document a deduction. In such cases, advice
will tend unilaterally to lower expected sanctions for both desirable
and undesirable contemplated conduct.
For reasons we discussed in our prior article, in such circumstances the increase in favorable information created or disclosed
about conduct will still tend to exceed the decrease in unfavorable information. 84 Various factors contribute to this result. First, even
when other actors have no access to information held by the party
receiving advice, advice should still enable the party to classify more
information as relevant and to identify more information to create,
produce, document, or preserve. Second, for any advice given, the
lawyer's own susceptibility to sanctions for nondisclosure should,
when an applicable law requires disclosure, result in the disclosure of
additional information. 85 Finally, for any set of information that can
be created or disclosed by either party, advice about information selection can increase the favorable information created or disclosed from
this set more than it can reduce the unfavorable information created or
disclosed.
This informational conclusion has behavioral relevance because
there will tend to be more favorable information that can be created,
preserved, or produced about desirable conduct than about undesirable conduct. For example, a taxpayer will normally have or be able
to document more evidence to support a justified deduction than an
unjustified one. As a result of these factors, unilateral conduct advice
should decrease expected sanctions for desirable conduct somewhat
more than for undesirable conduct.
In some cases, though, the desirability of this differential effect on
expected sanctions may tum on whether the regime can (and does)
84. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 335-61, 373-74, 383-85 (describing the effects of
unilateral advice).
85. Id. at 352-55 (discussing effect in litigation of lawyers' special susceptibility to sanctions);
cf. Kraakman, supra note 33, at 82-83 (discussing due diligence review by attorneys under§ 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933). Moreover, because attorneys and law firms are repeat players, they
may have reputational interests in being more forthcoming than their clients might wish.
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adjust expected sanctions to take account of the effects of unilateral
advice. 86 Since legal advice may reduce the detectability of both desirable and undesirable conduct, transactions involving lawyer participation may require additional investments in enforcement resources.
Alternatively, the regime might increase actual sanctions for legally
advised parties to offset the decline in expected sanctions for undesirable actors, without fully offsetting the decline in expected sanctions
for desirable actors. Or actual sanctions might be increased to offset
the decline in expected sanctions for desirable actors while resulting in
a net increase in sanctions for undesirable actors.
Significantly, many legal rules do in fact require or permit the tribunal to adjust the sanctions applicable to disputed nonlitigation
transactions in order to disfavor a party whose greater legal sophistication actually or presumptively enabled it to exercise disproportionate
influence on the information reaching the tribunal about the transaction. Examples include the strict rules of fairness governing business
transactions between lawyers and clients; 87 the rules governing the
construction and application of insurance policies, which strongly
favor policyholders; 88 and the doctrine of unconscionability, which
gives explicit weight to differences in the transacting parties' legal sophistication. 89 Similarly, on the reasonable assumption that the party
with better access to a lawyer is more likely to take charge of drafting,
the general rule that contracts should be construed against the drafter
may also reflect this approach.
Still, in some instances unilateral ex ante advice that lowers expected sanctions will not have beneficial net effects. This is most
likely, we think, for cases in which the marginal returns to legal advice
diminish more sharply for desirable conduct than for undesirable conduct. 90 This can occur because, even in an imperfect regime of sanctions, expected sanctions for desirable conduct are often much lower
than those for undesirable conduct. For example, an unadvised taxpayer taking a lawful deduction may face much lower expected sanctions than an unadvised taxpayer taking an unlawful deduction.
86. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 386-91.
87. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.8(a) (1992).
88. See FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 625-634 (3d ed.
1986).
89. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§§ 5.108(4)(e), (5)(c), 7 U.L.A. 168 (1974); see also
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 763-73
(1982) (proposing and defending a limit on the enforcement of bargained promises in cases of
"transactional incapacity").
90. For discussion of this phenomenon as it applies to advice given in litigation, see Bundy &
Elhauge, supra note 33, at 384-85.
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Consequently, even though there may be a greater number of taxpayers helped by advice about lawful deductions, there is greater potential
for advice to improve the situation of the would-be violators.
The risk that marginal returns to advice will diminish more
sharply for desirable than undesirable conduct depends in important
part on the precision of the sanctioning regime. In a regime designed
so that desirable conduct never faces positive expected sanctions, ex
ante advice can never lower sanctions for desirable conduct; advice for
undesirable conduct will always have higher marginal returns. In effect, Shavell assumes such a regime as the basis for his conclusion that
all ex ante advice that lowers expected sanctions is undesirable. But
we can now see that this regime represents the limiting case for the
desirability of such advice, rather than the paradigm case.
Accordingly, unlike Kaplow and Shavell, we do not think that advice that helps parties lower the actual level of expected sanctions for
contemplated conduct is always undesirable, even if sanctions are optimally set. Such advice is often socially desirable. Indeed, advice that
lowers sanctions generally tends to have desirable effects. To be sure,
this tendency may depend on the ability of other parties to influence
sanctions and on the ability of the sanctioning regime to adjust sanctions. There will also be cases where, due to diminishing marginal
returns from advice, the net effects of unilateral advice clearly favor
undesirable conduct. In such cases, restrictions on advice that lowers
expected sanctions may well be justified. But there is no justification
for drawing a sharp categorical distinction between advice that simply
communicates the level of expected sanctions and advice that alters
that level.
3.

Conclusion

Although the work of Kaplow and Shavell has greatly advanced
the economic modeling of legal advice, we are forced to disagree with
their conclusions about the desirability of different categories of legal
counseling. The differences in conclusions stem from differences in
assumptions. Although not explicit in their work, Kaplow and
Shavell have implicitly analyzed the desirability of advice under a regime of "perfect" sanctions that is not only unrealistic but undesirable,
even in an ideal world. 91 The performance of legal advice under such
91. See Part I. A similar difference in assumptions also underlies the differences between our
conclusions and some of those reached in Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed lndi·
vidua/s, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. &
0RG. 93, 109-11 (1990). Kaplow assumes, we think implausibly, that harmless acts are never
illegal and never sanctioned, see id. at 96-97, and that "acts not subject to sanctions cause no
harm." Id. at 102 n.13. In any event, his analysis focuses on a related, but different, issue:
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perfect sanctioning regimes is at best irrelevant. 92
Worse, such analyses can be misleading if the subtext to the claim
that advice about perfect sanctions is desirable is that, if adverse behavioral effects persist, the target of blame and reform should be the
sanctioning regime rather than the advice. For advice about optimal
but imperfect sanctions, or at least some forms of such advice, may
well be undesirable and thus an appropriate target of reform. The relevant question is thus whether legal advice about sanctions is desirable
under a regime that, although unavoidably imperfect, at least optimizes behavior in the face of unavoidable imperfection. Only if and
when the answer to this question is "yes" can a plausible case be made
that the best target of reform is not legal advice but any nonoptimal
sanctions.
One must, however, take into account that the option of reforming
the regime of sanctions will not always be feasible. Sometimes the
lawmaking process is too sloppy or biased to optimize sanctions: special interests may, for example, have "captured" the legislature. 93
Other times even perfectly conscientious lawmakers cannot assure optimal sanctions. The definition of sanctionable conduct may fag behind societal changes. Transaction costs may prove significant: the
costs of defining sanctionable conduct (including the cost of securing
legislative action) may exceed the benefits of a more optimal definition.
More fundamentally, society may choose not to optimize sanctions
solely in terms of their behavioral effects. It may regard mistaken
sanctioning as inherently wrong because it punishes the innocent or
whether and why ignorance of the law should or should not be a defense or basis for adjusting
legal sanctions. Id. at 114-17.
92. In a more recent piece, Kaplow and Shaven do analyze the desirability of advice given
tribunal error, concluding that advice about tribunal error in strict liability cases is always socially undesirable. Kaplow & Shaven, supra note 75, at 308, 312-14. They reach this conclusion,
however, for two reasons.
First, they assume that sanctions serve solely as a price tag that measures the harm inflicted
by the given conduct, making conduct desirable if and only if the private benefits exceed the
"price," that is, the social harm measured by appropriately set sanctions. Accordingly, in their
model an increase or decrease in sanctions from the appropriate level causes more undesirable
conduct because the "mispricing" leads either to too much care, if the price is too high, or to too
little care, if the price is too low. Although some civil penalties do undoubtedly serve only a
price-tag function, Kaplow and Shavell's reasoning is inapplicable when the undesirability of
conduct does not depend on the level of private benefits, which we think better describes typical
regulation.
Second, Kaplow and Shaven separate advice about the appropriate level of sanctions from
advice about trial error. The client who learns about the trial error is thus presumed to already
know the appropriate level of sanctions. See id. at 308, 312-13. If one more realistically assumes
that ex ante legal advice will simultaneously provide both sorts of advice, then an increase or
decrease in the desirability of conduct is possible.
93. See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-44 (1991) (describing interest group theory).
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fails to revenge or compensate injury, or it may take into account direct costs, such as the costs of incarceration. To the extent this is true,
optimal sanctions will not be those that optimize behavior, and the
overall behavioral consequences of legal advice about optimal sanctions will be ambiguous. When society uses such nonbehavioral measures to judge the social desirability of sanctions, ho'{llever, advice about
sanctions similarly should be judged, at least in part, by nonbehavioral
criteria. We assess the extent to which such criteria might justify advice about sanctions in section III.A.

C.

The Desirability of Litigation Advice Versus Legal Counseling

We now return to the claim that the social desirability of litigation
advice and primary conduct categorically differ. Recall that this claim
takes two forms. The first is Kaplow and Shavell's fifth conclusion:
that a "sharp contrast" exists between the "socially desirable character
of legal advice offered ex ante" to primary conduct and the "questionable social value of advice offered during litigation." 94 The second is
the claim, prominently featured in Kaye, Scholer's legal defense, that
litigation advice is categorically more desirable than advice about primary conduct. We begin with Kaplow and Shavell's claim.
In prior writing, we have questioned Kaplow and Shavell's analysis of litigation advice from a solely ex post perspective - expressly
restricting ourselves, as Kaplow and Shavell did, to the effects of litigation advice on the information presented about past primary conduct. 95 We there concluded that, even if advised parties pursue
opportunities to suppress or withhold information, the overall informational effects of litigation advice will generally help tribunals decide
more accurately who should be sanctioned. 96 Here we challenge the
very assumption that evaluating litigation advice should proceed from
an ex post perspective.
An initial practical problem facing any categorical distinction between litigation and primary conduct advice is that the two forms of
advice overlap to a great extent. Advice during litigation often informs parties about the legal sanctions applicable to future primary
conduct. 97 It seems undeniable, for example, that Kaye, Scholer's representation of Lincoln Savings before the Office of Thrift Supervision,
94. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597, 600, 614-15; see
supra text accompanying note 71.
95. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 319, 349 & n.84, 402 & n.223.
96. Id. at 319, 335-61.
97. Kaplow and Shavell's second piece on the subject avoids this problem because it does not
distinguish legal counseling from litigation advice but rather distinguishes advice given before
conduct from advice given after conduct. See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Acts Al-
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even if fairly characterized as litigation advice, also provided Lincoln
with substantial information about ongoing compliance issues. 98 Further, advice prior to primary conduct often concerns evidentiary issues. It is difficult, for example, to know whether to characterize
advice about whether to comply with or breach a contract as directed
to primary conduct or to litigation conduct. Indeed, as Kaplow and
Shaven concede,99 the likelihood of parties obtaining litigation advice
ex ante to primary conduct will naturally increase if the law, relying
on the supposed sharp contrast, attempts to restrict advice during
litigation.
More fundamentally, even classic litigation advice is, like advice
prior to primary conduct, actually ex ante advice about the sanctions
applicable to contemplated conduct. There are, to be sure, some differences. The contemplated conduct guided by litigation advice is generally not primary conduct but evidentiary conduct, such as
investigating, suppressing, withholding, producing, or presenting information in litigation. And the sanctions for misconduct are usually
provided not by the laws governing primary conduct, but by the evidentiary sanctions imposed under the rules governing the production
of evidence. 100 But these are differences in form, not substance. Our
analysis of advice about sanctions thus applies just as much to advice
about evidentiary sanctions as to advice about primary conduct sanctions. Kaplow and Shavell's contrary conclusion101 rests not on a
comparative analysis of the sanctions applicable to evidentiary versus
primary conduct, but rather on a model that abstracts from the existence and effect of evidentiary sanctions. 102
The problem of imprecise sanctioning is essentially the same for
litigation conduct as for primary conduct. As with primary conduct,
it is often difficult to determine whether litigation conduct is desirable
or undesirable. Withholding and suppression sometimes leave no
traces because they occur in private. When a witness "forgets" a conversation, no one can directly observe whether her lack of recall is real
ready Committed, supra note 4, at 149. This second distinction is, however, vulnerable to all the
other problems discussed in this section.
98. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1190-91 (describing the potential overlap between
litigation and counseling advice in that case).
·
99. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 599.
100. Evidentiary sanctions include discovery sanctions and penalties imposed for perjury or
refusing to testify. They also include implicit sanctions, such as when a tribunal draws an adverse inference about a party's entire testimony or case when some of her testimony appears false.
See generally Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 321 (defining evidentiary sanctions).
101. They treat their analysis of advice about sanctions as inapplicable to litigation advice.
See Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597.
102. See id. at 571.
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or feigned. This means that sometimes undesirable withholding or
suppression is indistinguishable from the desirable production of information. The person who truly did not witness or does not remember
an event can closely resemble the person who falsely claims not to
have done so. The person who accurately claims that he did not intend to kill when he fired the fatal shot will often closely resemble the
person who falsely makes the same claim.
Moreover, withholding or suppressing information can be socially
desirable. Some withholding or suppression may promote desirable
out-of-court conduct or protect against invasions of privacy. 103 Many
evidentiary privileges, including the Fourth Amendment, fall into this
category. Other withholding or suppression may promote desirable
conduct in litigation. Assertions of attorney-client privilege and workproduct doctrine are said to have this effect. 104 Finally, withholding
or suppression may protect against coercive or unfair tactics by the
opponent. In civil actions, this consideration might justify the right to
object to unduly burdensome discovery and unfair or misleading
cross-examination. In criminal cases, this principle supports the rights
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 105 To the extent it is difficult
not only to determine whether withholding or suppression is occurring
but also to distinguish between desirable and undesirable forms of
withholding and suppression, this further impairs the tribunal's ability
to distinguish between desirable and undesirable evidentiary conduct.
As with primary conduct, the legal regime responds to its inability
to distinguish with certainty between desirable and undesirable evidentiary conduct with three strategies: (1) sanctioning when certain
probability thresholds are met in adjudication; (2) defining the sanctionable conduct using criteria that provide greater certainty but are
less closely correlated to social desirability; and (3) adjusting the level
of sanctions.
Take, for example, the offense of lying to the tribunal. Sanctioning
lies only when they can be detected with certainty may underdeter
lying. Indeed, observers generally consider the criminal law of perjury, which demands proof that is close to certainty, to be ineffec103. See generally Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 349 n.82 (discussing Fourth
Amendment).
104. See generally id. at 401-13 (analyzing effects of attorney-client and work-product
privileges).
105. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460
(1966) (stating that a principal purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to protect against government
coercion). The values promoted by the Fifth Amendment might well justify suppression that
took the form of apt advice to a nonparty witness that she ought to decline to testify. See Bundy
& Elhauge, supra note 33, at 326 & n.39.
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tive. 106 Tribunals may, however, implement a threshold probability
strategy by forming ad hoc estimates of the probability the witness has
lied based on his demeanor, his motive and opportunity to lie, and
other, more reliable evidence about the case. If a threshold probability
is met, the tribunal can then sanction the party presenting the testimony by discrediting either the seemingly false testimony itself or
other evidence in the party's case that would otherwise seem credible
and that may actually be true. 107 The tribunal may also increase or
reduce the severity of the sanction imposed at final judgment to punish
a party who, it believes, has knowingly presented false testimony. 108
The lower the threshold probability required to trigger such sanctions,
the more desirable evidentiary conduct (truthtelling) will be sanctioned; the higher the probability, the more undesirable evidentiary
conduct (lying) will go unsanctioned.
Alternatively, lawmakers may apply a more broadly framed rule.
Such a rule might, for example, disqualify parties or other interested
persons as witnesses in all cases. English and U.S. law formerly pursued versions of this approach in both civil and criminal cases. 109 A
more narrow version of such a rule might disqualify interested parties
from testifying only when their testimony is especially hard to verify.
The "Dead Man's Act," which bars the survivor of a transaction with
a deceased person from testifying against that person's estate, illustrates this principle. 110 Either effort to redefine the sanctionable conduct will plainly be under- and overinclusive: the rule will not
sanction lying by persons who fall outside the disqualified categories,
and it will prevent both true and false testimony from persons who are
disqualified. 111 Principally for this reason, the Supreme Court rejected
broad rules of testimonial disqualification as unconstitutional in criminal cases. 112
Finally, the tribunal may not wholly discredit or disallow testimony but instead may discount apparently unreliable testimony by the
106. See FRANK, supra note 1, at 85.
107. 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1010, at 983 (John H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
108. For example, judges may increase the sentence of convicted defendants whom they believe testified falsely at trial. The Supreme Court held this practice consistent with both federal
sentencing law and the Constitution in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
109. 2 WtGMORE, supra note 107, § 576.
110. See id. § 578, at 819-20 (citing Owens v. Owens's Admr., 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878);
Louis's Admr. v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470, 471 (1874)).
111. Indeed, those who attack disqualification on the ground of interest do so on precisely
this ground. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 107, § 578, at 821.
112. The Supreme Court has rejected these rules as applied to both defendants, Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1987); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), and codefendants. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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probability that it is untrue. This corresponds to adjusting the level of
sanctions in a manner that may be optimal, but ~hich undersanctions
undesirable conduct and oversanctions desirable conduct. Liars will
benefit more than they should, while those who tell the truth will benefit less than they should. The higher the discount, the less the regime
will undersanction undesirable evidentiary conduct but the more it
will oversanction desirable evidentiary conduct.
Plainly none of these strategies can achieve perfect sanctioning.
But there is no evident reason to think that one can make the sanctioning of primary conduct any more perfect. The basic forms of withholding and suppressing information, ranging from murder (of
witnesses) to simple nondisclosure, have analogues in primary conduct. In particular, the fact that evidentiary conduct involves disclosure obligations, and hence the risk of undetectable failures to disclose,
does not distinguish it from primary conduct, as the extensive regulation of disclosures in securities, tax, environmental, tort, and contract
law demonstrates. Indeed, failures to disclose in litigation arguably
present an easier problem of detection than some nonlitigation failures
to disclose because in litigation the opponent and the tribunal are both
alerted to the possibility of wrongful suppression and nondisclosure
and have incentives to detect them.
Given the lack of theoretical foundation for the conclusion that
litigation advice is categorically less desirable than primary conduct,
that conclusion must rest on an empirical claim that current evidentiary sanctions are in fact less perfect or optimal than current primary
conduct sanctions. Such an empirical claim seems difficult to sustain.
It would require showing how frequently evidentiary sanctions undersanction undesirable conduct or oversanction desirable conduct, and
then showing, for representative categories of primary conduct, that
the imperfection is lower.
Certainly Kaplow and Shavell's account does not sustain this burden. Their account assumes the existence of a set of information over
which a party can exercise control, in the sense that withholding or
suppressing the information is not deterred. 113 But neither the existence of a set of information whose wrongful withholding or suppression is undersanctioned, nor the occurrence of some acts of wrongful
withholding or suppression, establishes the comparative superiority of
advice about sanctions for primary conduct. After all, expected sanctions for wrongful primary conduct also frequently underdeter undesirable conduct, and wrongful acts of primary conduct occur as well.
113. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 570-76, 577 n.25.
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Kaplow and Shavell's posited "sharp contrast" between the social
value of advice about evidentiary conduct and advice about primary
conduct thus rests on a misleading comparison between a regime of
evidentiary sanctions that is assumed, but not demonstrated, to be ineffective and a regime of sanctions for primary conduct that is assumed, but not demonstrated, to be perfect.
More fundamentally, the failure of evidentiary sanctions to deter
all withholding or suppression cannot be conclusive because such evidentiary conduct is sometimes socially desirable. 114 To the extent
withholding and suppression are desirable, the desirability of litigation
advice (and in particular advice about evidentiary sanctions) cannot be
judged, as we were willing to do in our prior article, 11 5 solely by its
effects on the information reaching tribunals. Rather it must be
judged by whether it advances overall societal interests - including
the interests served by withholding and suppression.
Under this standard, if evidentiary sanctions optimize evidentiary
conduct, then litigation advice may well tend to be desirable even
when it has a negative effect on the information reaching tribunals.
True, such negative informational effects may worsen the regime's
ability to sanction the primary conduct that is the subject of litigation.
But the regime has no reason to focus exclusively on optimizing primary conduct. Nor, if it chooses to pursue that goal, must it do so
exclusively by increasing the accuracy with which adjudication identifies the desirability of primary conduct. 116 Instead, the regime may
aim to optimize the combination of primary and litigation conduct by
implementing the sanctioning regime that minimizes the total adverse
consequences of undersanctioning undesirable primary and litigation
conduct and oversanctioning desirable primary and litigation conduct.
We conclude, therefore, that the claim that advice about evidentiary conduct is systematically inferior to advice about primary conduct cannot be sustained. Both forms of advice will correct over- and
underestimations of expected sanctions, with desirable and undesirable
behavioral consequences. 117 Both will overall tend to have desirable
114. See supra section I.A and text accompanying notes 103-05.
115. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 380-96 (analyzing desirability solely of the
informational effects of advice).
116. See supra section I.A (noting that increased information might itself deter desirable
primary conduct).
117. The beneficial behavioral consequences of correcting overestimations of evidentiary
sanctions may sometimes be indirect. Take, for example, a party who overestimates discovery
sanctions for failing to produce a document they truly do not possess. In the extreme this may
deter the desirable production of the information that the party truly does not have the document
by tempting the party to create a false document. Perhaps more likely, this may deter the party
from engaging in other desirable litigation conduct - such as litigating a legitimate claim or
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behavioral consequences, unless sanctions do not optimize behavior or
a systemic divergence exists between the misperceptions of desirable
and undesirable actors.
Both types of advice will also help parties take steps, prior to engaging in conduct, to influence the information that will reach the tribunal about that conduct. 118 In other words, both types of advice will
affect the level of expected sanctions. When both parties seek to shape
the information that will reach the tribunal, this effect should be desirable.119 One might, if anything, expect this desirable result more often
in the litigation context, in which parties know and have focused on
their adversary, than in the nonlitigation context, in which affected
parties often do not know or monitor the parties who injure them.
When only one party acts to shape the information that will reach the
tribunal, advice should also tend to be desirable, although this may
depend in part on the regime's ability to adjust sanctions. 120
This framework also makes it possible to show why the claim that
litigation advice is categorically more desirable than advice about primary conduct, while seemingly plausible, ultimately fails as well. The
core of that claim rests on the presence in open court of a legally advised adversary and a tribunal. Their presence, the argument goes,
greatly reduces the lawyer's concern that his advice and assistance will
have harmful consequences. Because concealment and fabrication of
evidence are more likely to be detected and sanctioned, his advice
about the level of expected sanctions will tend to deter it. Moreover,
because of the presence of the opponent, the lawyer need have no fear
that his advice about how to lower sanctions for withholding or
fabrication of evidence will result in net harmful consequences because
the opposing counsel's advice will tend to neutralize it. 121 In contrast,
in nonlitigation counseling situations, the observing opponent, her
lawyer, and the tribunal are absent. 122 In consequence, the counselor
who provides full advice, either about the level of expected sanctions
defense or presenting other information - that seems likely to lead to a request for a document.
Deterring such litigation conduct will skew sanctions for primary conduct.
118. Legal counseling will affect the information that reaches the tribunal about contemplated primary conduct in the ways described supra in section 11.B.2. Litigation advice will
affect, in the same ways, information that reaches the tribunal about contemplated litigation
conduct. It will also affect the information that reaches the tribunal about past conduct in the
ways described in Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 335-61.
119. See supra text accompanying note 81.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
121. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1184 & nn.159-60 (outlining and apparently endorsing this
claim, at least when there is no substantial imbalance in the advice available to the parties).
122. See id. at 1188 (in the "prototypical counseling situation," only one party is present and
represented by counsel).
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or how to lower them, runs a greater risk of facilitating undesirable
conduct.
Within our framework of analysis, this claim is most plausible if
understood as asserting that ex ante advice that allows a party to lower
her expected sanctions (or raise her opponent's expected sanctions) for
evidentiary conduct is categorically superior to comparable ex ante advice for primary conduct. As we have shown, there is no reason to
believe that the scope or level of expected evidentiary sanctions, uninfluenced by advice that potentially lowers (or raises) those sanctions, is
any more optimal than the scope or level of similarly uninfluenced
primary conduct sanctions. Nor is there any strong reason to think
that parties' estimates of expected evidentiary sanctions are more
likely to be systematically skewed in ways that produce desirable behavioral effects. If advice about the scope and level of evidentiary
sanctions is categorically superior to advice about the scope and level
of primary conduct sanctions, therefore, it must be because advice
about how to influence the level of expected sanctions in litigation is
categorically more likely to move the overall level of expected sanctions to optimal levels than is advice outside of litigation.
Understood as a claim about the effects of advice that lowers expected sanctions by creating, producing, or concealing information
about evidentiary conduct, the claim for the superiority of litigation
advice contains a core of persuasive insight. As we have seen, such
advice is generally more likely to be beneficial to the extent that another interested actor can observe the party's conduct and still more
beneficial to the extent that the observer has legal advice. In a wellrun courtroom - where both parties are aware of each other's motives, can observe each other's evidentiary conduct, have lawyers, and
can resort to the tribunal for prompt rulings on disputed questions one might therefore expect that advice about how to lower one's own
evidentiary sanctions (or raise one's opponent's) will often have desirable effects.
The force of this insight, however, leaves us a long way from a
categorical distinction between nonlitigation and litigation advice. We
need to know more about the relative frequency of these conditions in
litigation and nonlitigation settings. The argument would be easy if in
litigation evidentiary conduct were always observable, both sides always had competent counsel, and the tribunal was always present,
while interested actors rarely observed primary conduct or rarely had
legal advice. 123 But this is not the case. Evidentiary conduct varies
123. Fuller's account, which contrasts the conduct of competent paired advocates "in open
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sharply in the extent to which it is subject to observation by the opponent. Lawyers' arguments and direct testimony can be closely observed, but most trial preparation cannot. Moreover, much litigation
features severe imbalances in parties' legal advice.
Conversely, in many cases in which an actor receives advice about
how to lower expected sanctions for primary conduct, that conduct is
subject to observation by someone who has a substantial incentive to
monitor the actor's conduct and increase his sanctions for any undesirable conduct. This will be true, for example, in most contractual settings and in many regulatory settings. Much of the conduct that
Kaye, Scholer was charged with assisting, for example, was observable, and observed, by the Bank Board. 124 Often that observer will
have legal advice. Indeed, the situation in which all interested participants, including government regulators, have advice is probably typical of most complex transactional and regulatory work.
Thus in both litigation and nonlitigation settings, there will be
many occasions in which advice about how to lower expected sanctions for engaging in conduct will be strongly desirable because there
is a high likelihood that the conduct can be observed, that the observer
will be interested, and that the observer will have comparable competent legal advice. In both settings, there will also be occasions when
one party has a disproportionate influence on the information that will
reach the tribunal, either because the actor receiving advice controls
more information about the conduct or has better legal advice; in these
cases the desirability of advice will sometimes depend on the regime's
ability to adjust sanctions.
Finally, in each setting there will be occasions when sanctions cannot be adjusted to take advantage of increases in information resulting
from the provision of advice or when advice simply reduces sanctions
more for undesirable than for desirable conduct. Absent some reason
to think, however, that situations of the last type are more common
when advice is given outside the litigation setting, a categorical claim
for the superiority of litigation advice cannot stand.
Ill.

NONCATEGORICAL REsTRICTIONS ON ADVICE

We have identified two main classes of advice about expected sanctions that have undesirable effects on the behavior of recipients. First,
parties who learn that expected sanctions for desirable conduct are
court" with the conduct of a single lawyer offering "quiet counsel" in the privacy of his own
office, typifies this view. Fuller & Randall, supra note 7, at 1161.
124. See Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1173 & n.116 (describing such a situation).
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higher than they thought will be led to refrain from desirable conduct.
Second, parties who learn that expected sanctions for undesirable conduct are lower than they thought, or who get advice about how to
lower them, will sometimes be led to engage in undesirable conduct. If
the legal regime could reliably identify actors who tend to make socially desirable mistakes about expected sanctions, selectively denying
them advice would improve the optimization of over- and underdeterrence. In section Ill.A we argue that, even if such targeted denials
could be made accurately, they would often conflict with principles of
fairness. In section III.B we address the problem that efforts to deny
advice that produces undesirable consequences will also deter or deny
desirable advice.
A. Fairness Justifications for Advice with Adverse Behavioral
Consequences

The fairness claim is clearest in the case of those who would forgo
desirable acts if advised about the true risk of sanctions. Denying such
persons advice would penalize them not because they are potential
lawbreakers, but because (without advice) they would engage in more
desirable conduct. To allow such persons to proceed in ignorance is
unfair because it violates the principle that "one should be able to
know of the law in order that one can obey it." 125 Denying them advice also returns evil for good because it increases both the likelihood
that the person will act as society wishes and the likelihood that society will punish the person. In a just regime, it may sometimes be inevitable that those who act desirably will face a risk of sanctions. But it
is hard to see how it can be just to impose this risk on desirable actors
when they have been denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge that would have prevented them from engaging in the conduct
subject to the risk of sanctions.
These principles do not justify giving advice when it would cause
persons to engage in undesirable acts, assuming that such persons can
be identified. For example, actors who would steal from others if accurately advised that the risk of punishment was lower than they
thought cannot plausibly claim unfairness if they are denied such advice.126 It might be argued that even those who predictably will engage in wrongdoing if fully advised are entitled to advice as a matter of
125. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 609. Because of
what we argue is their false distinction between legal counseling and litigation advice, Kaplow
and Shavell conclude that this principle justifies advice about primary conduct but not advice
about litigation conduct. Id. at 609 & n.113.
,
126. Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 672 ("If the individual's actions fall outside the sphere
of autonomy he cannot complain of a deprivation of autonomy, when he discovers that the fear
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personal autonomy or dignity. But such claims have questionable
force when the actor is an organization, rather than an individual. 127
More fundamentally, it is difficult to frame an attractive conception of
individual autonomy that would justify such advice, at least when the
undesirability of the resulting conduct is sufficiently clear and its likelihood sufficiently high. 128 The autonomy claim is especially problematic if, as is usually the case, the undesirable conduct harms innocent
actors because then the claim amounts to favoring the autonomy of
the undesirable actor to commit harm over the autonomy of the innocent actor to be free of undesirable harm.
As a general rule, then, it is not unfair to deny advice to an actor
when the legal system can be certain that the advice would lead him to
engage in undesirable conduct. But some persons denied advice on
that ground may have a claim of unfairness if other persons have, or
can obtain, knowledge about sanctions for undesirable conduct that
enables them to harm the person denied advice.
The supposed obligation to tell the "the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth" illustrates the point. Ostensibly, this oath obligates witnesses to volunteer information. In fact, although a literal
violation of the oath, a party who is not asked about certain information can legally fail to volunteer it. Suppose, however, that an unadvised party believes the oath and volunteers information on the
assumption that failure to comply with the oath will be detected and
that shaped his conduct was excessive and that . . . he could have violated his duty with
impunity.").
127. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV.
589, 607-08 (1985) (corporations lack claim to individual autonomy). See generally MEIR DAN·
COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A BUREAUCRATIC
SOCIETY (1986) (same).
128. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 671-72 (arguing that keeping a would-be wrongdoer in ignorance does not infringe Kantian autonomy). Perhaps for that reason, those who
found the right to advice on autonomy or dignity normally would not extend that right to persons who will certainly use advice to engage in undesirable conduct. Instead they argue that
lawyers should not too readily conclude either: (1) that any particular class of conduct is undesirable, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51-57
(1975); Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAW·
YER 123, 126-33 (David Luban ed., 1983); or (2) that any particular client, if fully advised, would
in fact engage in such conduct. See, e.g.. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAW·
YERS' ETHICS 159 (1990) (arguing that a lawyer giving advice should not assume that the client
when advised will engage in wrongdoing, even if the client has a strong incentive to do so).
These more limited positions are not necessarily inconsistent with the account offered here.
To the extent they treat freedom of choice as a positive good that can render otherwise undesirable conduct desirable, they can be incorporated into a system of optimal sanctions that gives
independent weight to party autonomy. See supra section I.B. To the extent they claim that
lawyers will make mistakes about whether conduct is undesirable or whether the client, if advised, will engage in it, they imply that full advice is more likely to produce desirable than
undesirable conduct.
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heavily sanctioned. Such a party will often be victimized by an opponent who understands and acts upon the real rules.
If society is not prepared to invest what is required to deter the
wrongful conduct of those who are already knowledgeable, fairness
may require allowing both parties to learn and act upon the real rules
of the game. We might tentatively state this disturbing principle in
this way: when (1) undesirable litigation conduct is not sanctionable,
or, though technically sanctionable, is not in fact sanctioned, and (2)
one can confidently predict that one party, given its incentives and
level of knowledge, will engage in such conduct, then depriving the
opposing party of knowledge that would enable him to engage in comparable conduct is unfair.
This same principle can sometimes apply to advice about primary
conduct. For example, suppose two sellers get advice that lowers their
expected antitrust sanctions for a merger that will give them monopoly power and allow them to raise prices. In those circumstances, a
group of buyers may have a fairness claim to advice that lowers their
expected antitrust sanctions for forming an anticompetitive buying association that will give them countervailing market power.
Common sense and common morality both suggest that this "fair
fight" principle has limits. Because in its pure form the principle rests
largely upon an intuition that equal treatment is inherently fairer,
rather than upon any discernable improvement in social welfare, its
normative force seems relatively weak. It hardly justifies advice that
results in harm to nonparties or to those who are not engaging in undesirable conduct that injures the party. It also may not justify advice
that will lead to plainly wrongful conduct, such as perjury or bribery.
Most important, the principle does not apply if sanctions for the opponent's undesirable conduct are available and reasonably effective, because then the first premise for the application of the principle fails.
This will often be the case when, as the second premise requires, one
can confidently predict the opponent's undesirable conduct. If the opponent's predictably undesirable conduct remains effectively unsanctioned, then a reform in sanctions would ordinarily seem justified.
Nonetheless, the fair fight principle might justify a variety of advice about sanctions that causes parties to engage in undesirable but
underdeterred conduct. Fair fight arguments may, in fact, often extend beyond fairness. For example, in the countervailing power example, forming the buying association may be a "second-best" solution
that will result in more efficient prices and outputs than would result if
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only the sellers had monopoly power. 129 Likewise, consider again the
obligation to tell the whole truth. Now assume that the tribunal has
already adjusted sanctions to reflect the general understanding among
litigants that information should not be volunteered but has not adjusted sanctions to compensate for the fact that one of the litigants
does not have legal advice. Given these assumptions, the tribunal will
often assume that the unadvised litigant is not volunteering information, even when she in fact is being forthcoming. In such cases the
unadvised litigant has more than a fairness claim to advice: she can
claim that more accurate adjudication will result if both parties have
advice that corrects overestimations of sanctions for undesirable withholding than if only the opponent does.
In short, if an opponent predictably engages in undesirable conduct, ordinarily undesirable primary or evidentiary behavior - such
as anticompetitive combinations or withholding information - may
become desirable. In these circumstances the desirability of advice
that lowers or corrects overestimations of sanctions for the conduct in
question is not paradoxical: the advice is desirable because the ostensi- ·
bly undesirable conduct is in fact desirable. 130
B.

The Overdeterrence Problem with Restricting Undesirable Advice

Traditional regulation of legal advice allows much advice with undesirable behavioral consequences. Lawyers cannot "counsel a client
to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." 131 But the professional rules permit lawyers to advise clients whose conduct is not known to be criminal or fraudulent,
no matter what the likelihood that the advice will cause undesirable
conduct. 132 This bright-line rule encompasses both neutral "advice"
about the scope of sanctionability or the level of expected sanctions
129. See generally PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 40-42, 195 & n.24, 223 n.46 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing countervailing
power and second best theory).
130. This insight turns out to be at the core of many defenses of deceptive lawyer tactics in
litigation. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 1, at 1100-02, 1108 (arguing that the lawyer should be free
to use deceptive tactics when it would promote an informed resolution of the case).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.2(d) (1992). The formulation of
the prohibition on assistance in the Model Code may be more restrictive, stating that a lawyer
"shall not •.. [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980) (empha·
sis added); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1980) ("A lawyer
should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to
violate the law and avoid punishment.").
·
132. Lawyers have some freedom not to provide advice, either by declining to accept a client,
negotiating express limitations on the scope of the representation, MODEL RULES OF PROFES·
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (c) (1992), or withdrawing if the lawyer "reasonably believes" the
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and more active "counsel or assistance" designed to reduce expected
sanctions.
For conduct "known" to be a crime or fraud, the professional rules
eschew a bright-line approach. Although forbidden from "counseling" or "assisting," the lawyer remains obliged to provide full advice.
But the line between forbidden assistance and required advice is fuzzy.
At one extreme, clearly a lawyer can state that the contemplated conduct is unlawful and need not automatically withdraw even if the client insists on engaging in the conduct. 133 Equally clearly, at the other
extreme, a lawyer may not physically assist in the consummation of
the criminal or fraudulent act. 134 In between, the rules purport to recognize a "critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by
which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity." 135 When
clients can readily infer the forbidden "means" from the permitted
"analysis," however, the distinction becomes obscure both in theory
and practice. 136 The essential structure of these obligations is the
same for litigation as for counseling.131
client's proposed conduct to be "criminal or fraudulent" or finds it "repugnant or imprudent."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (b)(l), (3) (1992).
Subject to these limitations, however, the rules arguably require lawyers to provide both advice and assistance for much socially undesirable conduct. The obligation to provide full advice
is express. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1992) ("In representing a
client, a lawyer shall ... render candid advice."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1992) ("A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual
consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct."). The obligation to provide
"assistance" within the representation is also express in the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-lOl(A)(l) (1980) (a lawyer "shall not intentionally ... [t]ail to seek the
lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law") (footnotes
omitted), and implicit in the Model Rules, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.1 (1992) (obligating lawyers to "provide competent representation to a client"); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (b) (1992) (obligating lawyers to avoid any conflict of
interest - including strong ethical antagonism to the client's proposed course of action - that
"may .•. materially limit" the representation). The law of legal malpractice might also require
such advice. See infra text accompanying notes 182-83.
133. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally
Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669, 671 (1981) ("The law clearly sanctions providing
... simple, unsuggestive advice ...."). Withdrawal would be required only if continued involvement would violate a professional rule. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16
(1992).
134. Hazard, supra note 133, at 671 (stating that assistance clearly includes the "lawyer's
physical execution of a purpose that the client would like to realize but cannot or will not actually execute himself").
135. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1992).
136. See supra text accompanying note 51; WOLFRAM, supra note 50, § 13.3.2, at 695
("[T)he nature of that critical distinction is not made clear."); Charles Wolfram, Mapping the
Minefield: The Applicable Ethics Rules and Conflicting Duties in THE ATIORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 55, at 53, 67 ("[O]nly the most murky guidance on [the divide between
counseling and facilitation] is given in reported authority.").
137. For example, Model Rules 3.3 and 3.4(a), (b), which deal with advice and assistance to
evidentiary conduct, prohibit only knowing assistance in presenting false evidence or in the un-
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Both academic and regulatory critics of the profession argue that
the traditional rules permit too much undesirable legal advice. 138 For
those who take that view, there are two central regulatory possibilities.
The first strategy, which we have discussed extensively in our earlier
article, 139 is to establish bright-line rules keyed to aspects of the lawyer-client relationship that can be confidently observed at low cost,
rather than to the content and significance of advice in the particular
case. These rules intentionally sweep more broadly than the prohibition of advice that knowingly assists crime or fraud on the basis of a
generalization about the likely behavioral effects of advice. Examples
of such rules include small claims court rules forbidding the use of a
lawyer, 14-0 rules restricting the amounts that actors can pay for advice, 141 sequestration orders prohibiting consultation between a witness and his counsel during breaks in cross-examination, 142 and rules
governing the existence, invocation, and waiver of the right to counsel
in criminal cases.143
As our discussion in Part I shows, such rules are cheap to enforce
and easy to comply with. But, as that discussion also indicates and as
our earlier article shows in detail, because the rules are based on features of the lawyer-client relationship that relate only loosely to the
social value of the advice given, they run severe risks of overdeterrence
unless carefully tailored. 144 It is therefore understandable that their
use has been relatively limited.
lawful destruction or fabrication of evidence. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rules 3.3, 3.4(a), (b) (1992).
138. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 9, at 160-61 (arguing that lawyers should "dissociate themselves from projects that are immoral" even when professional rules would permit continued
representation); Simon, supra note l, at 1096 (arguing that current norms "authorize or require a
lawyer to act in a way that ... frustrates the most legally appropriate resolution of the matter").
Federal regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of
Thrift Supervision have expressed similar objections to the present professional rules, and
adopted alternative rules or practices. See, e.g., In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release
No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981) [hereinafter Carter & Johnson]; Order to Cease and Desist and For Affirmative Relief, In re Fishbein,
OTS AP-92-24 (Mar. 11, 1992) [hereinafter Kaye, Scholer Order].
139. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 396-401, 413-19.
140. Id. at 396-97 (discussing such restrictions).
141. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (criminal forfeiture which
effectively reduced amount that criminal defendant could pay his lawyer does not violate Sixth
Amendment); Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (limiting
the amount which government benefits claimants could pay their lawyers is consistent with due
process); Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 398-401 (analyzing such restrictions).
142. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (upholding such a restriction); see Bundy &
Elhauge, supra note 33, at 413-17.
143. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 418-19 & nn.273-77 (analyzing the effects of
such doctrines).
144. For an extended discussion of how the risks of overdeterrence limit the use of bright-line
restrictions upon ex ante advice to a testifying client about what to say in court, see id. at 413-17.
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Not surprisingly, then, many academic and regulatory critics of
the profession are drawn to a strategy of restricting advice based on a
case-by-case assessment of its consequences. They would reform professional codes and ethical norms to make prohibitions on advice and
assistance broader and more open-textured in three distinct ways.
First, they would expand the crime-fraud exception to encompass advice regarding a broader range of client conduct, including conduct
that is unlawful or simply socially undesirable. 145 Second, they would
impose liability based not just on attorney knowledge, but also on
recklessness or, in some versions, failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry.146 Third, they would require that lawyers go beyond refusing to
assist undesirable client conduct and actually take reasonable measures to prevent it. 147 For ease of expression, we will refer to the combination of such expanded legal prohibitions on giving undesirable
advice as a "general standard." 148
In this section, we assess this debate between the profession and its
critics and analyze the effects of requiring attorneys to deny advice
when it seems likely to have undesirable consequences. 149 We begin in
145. Those endorsing a standard that approaches social desirability include LUBAN, supra
note 9, at 173·74, and Simon, supra note 1, at 1093. Regulatory agencies tend to focus on lawfulness - defined in terms of the spirit or purpose of the law - without regard to whether the
conduct is a crime or fraud. See, e.g., Kaye, Scholer Order, supra note 138, 11 15(c) (forbidding
law firm from acting as counsel in a matter in which the client is "violating any applicable federal
banking statutes or regulations, including by attempting to evade any such regulations by elevating form over substance"). A similar statutory standard will apply to lawyers sued under the
Financial Institutions Recovery, Reform and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which permits imposition of liability for knowing or reckless participation "in any unsafe or unsound financial practice which is likely to cause more than minimal financial loss." Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 204(t)(6), 103 Stat. 183, 193 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (Supp. IV 1992)).
146. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 1, at 1097 (advocating denials of advice when the "lawyer
...[has] good reason to recognize" that an unjust result will follow from providing it); Kaye,
Scholer Order, supra note 138, 11 l(b) ("'knowledge' shall mean actual knowledge or reckless
disregard of the facts."); id. at 11 12 (imposing a variety of due diligence requirements). The
prime example of a diligence obligation for counselors is, of course, that imposed on counsel in a
public offering under § 11 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.
147. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1182,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28, 1981) (holding that lawyer must take reasonable measures to prevent unlawful conduct by client); Simon, supra note 1, at 1098, 1100 (lawyer who
concludes that advice will result in injustice must take "reasonably available actions" to promote
justice and prevent injustice).
148. We recognize that this broadly drawn contrast between a narrow version of the crimefraud rule and the general standard described in text brushes over many intermediate positions.
We do this because our purpose is to spell out the implications of a shift toward a general standard, rather than to defend any particular place along the line. For examples of intermediate
views focused on the obligations of lawyers for insured financial institutions, compare Wilkins,
supra note 8, at 1151-1215 (tending toward a general standard) with Jackson, supra note 53, at
1055-61 (tending toward the normal crime-fraud rules).
149. Other sorts of rules may effectively restrict the flow of advice, including: (1) rules governing the formation of the attorney-client relationship, such as those regulating client solicitation and advertising; (2) rules governing the financing of representation, such as those concerning
attorney fees, the sale of claims to lawyers, loans and advances to clients, and public subsidies for
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section III.B.1 by considering these proposals for a general standard
governing the provision of legal advice. We conclude that, although
such a general standard would indeed reduce the underdeterrence of
undesirable advice, it would also raise grave problems of overdeterrence: preventing or rendering unaffordable much desirable advice.
Moreover, this overdeterrence would disproportionately affect clients
who are poor, distressed, or inexperienced; who have one-shot or lowstakes claims; or who are from racial or socioeconomic backgrounds
different from their lawyers. We then consider in section III.B.2
whether such a general standard would be less problematic if it was
embodied in an ethical norm - rather than a legal prohibition against giving undesirable advice. Surprisingly, we conclude that the
case for such an ethical norm is not clearly better, and in some respects weaker, than that for the legal prohibition. To the extent such
an ethical norm were effective, it too would raise important overdeterrence problems, as well as undermining the standard of care for giving
advice under the law of legal malpractice. Finally, in section III.B.3,
we reconsider the traditional rule in light of the over- and underdeterrence problem. The traditional rule, we conclude, may well optimize
over- and underdeterrence of advice by triggering either a general
standard (in crime-fraud cases) or a bright-line rule (outside the crimefraud cases), depending on whether, given the circumstances,
overdeterrence or underdeterrence seems the more pressing problem.
1. A Legal Prohibition on Undesirable Advice

Proposals for general standards forbidding lawyers from offering
advice leading to undesirable consequences have suffered critique on
many grounds. Common critiques are that such general standards

legal advice; and (3) rules limiting the right to provide legal advice, such as those governing
admission to the profession and the unauthorized practice of law. Although such rules restrict
advice, none at present reflects an express policy of suppressing advice on account of its behavioral consequences. Some have argued, however, that some such rules were in the past intended,
at least in part, to deter selectively particular kinds of advice, principally advice deemed likely to
increase the likelihood of claims by personal injury, consumer, and civil rights plaintiffs. See,
e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 41-50 (1976) (arguing that rules on advertising, solicitation, acquiring an interest in
litigation, and division of fees among lawyers in the early twentieth century were designed to
favor corporate clients); Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons
as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 244, 262-66 (1968) (same). The desirability and
fairness of selective transmission in those settings seems doubtful but in any event is beyond the
scope of our discussion here.
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would be unenforceable 150 and infringe party autonomy.1 51 We do not
wish to recanvass this debate, other than to note that proponents of a
more general standard have responded to these and other traditional
critiques more persuasively than one might suppose. 152 Rather, we
want to emphasize an independent problem with general standards
prohibiting undesirable advice that proponents have not addressed:
the inevitable propensity of such general standards to overdeter desirable forms of advice.153
Thus, without addressing them directly, we put the traditional arguments, and responses to them, aside. With regard to enforceability,
we assume that, even if undesirable advice cannot be eliminated, some
of it could be deterred by legal sanctions under a standard prohibiting
undesirable advice. We further assume that, despite the value of autonomy, some advised misconduct falling short of known crime or
fraud remains socially undesirable, if only because such misconduct
infringes on the autonomy of others. On these assumptions, we think
that overdeterrence concerns provide an important reason to be wary
of general standards that seek to prohibit undesirable forms of advice.
The risk that a general standard would overdeter desirable advice
flows from two basic sources: (1) increased compliance costs; and (2)
increased expected sanctions for providing desirable advice. A general
standard will significantly increase compliance costs for several reasons. The due diligence obligation under such a standard would require more ~xtensive investigation in a broader range of cases.
Moreover, a general standard makes a broader range of information
potentially relevant to attorney liability. When the issue is whether
the advice will lead the client to do something undesirable, such information will include what the client knows, how the client would act
with and without legal advice, the consequences of those courses of
action, and, under broader formulations of the standard, which of the
two courses of action is more socially desirable. When the issue is the
150. See, e.g., James J. White, Machz"avelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 937-38 (discussing proposed requirements of fairness and candor in negotiation).
151. See, e.g., Donagan, supra note 128, at 133; Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Role:
A Defense, a Problem and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
152. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988);
Rhode, supra note 127; Simon, supra note 1, at 1119-44.
153. Many considerations advanced here apply in any gatekeeping regime in which liability
is imposed on a provider of goods or services in order to improve the behavior of the customer.
For general discussion, see Kraakman, supra note 33, at 74-81 (discussing overdeterrence
problems). For recent analyses of lawyers' obligations applying a gatekeeper analysis, see, for
example, Jackson, supra note 53; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 801 (1992).
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desirability of advice that assists the client in lowering expected sanctions, the lawyer will also want to assess issues of access to information and the motives and legal competence of possible observers.1 54
Collecting and evaluating this information is costly, and those costs
will inevitably increase legal fees. Increased fees, in tum, reduce the
advice bought and given, including much desirable legal advice.
More important, even a lawyer who diligently endeavored to provide only desirable advice would face substantial expected legal sanctions under a general standard. This would be especially true if the
standard embodies a nebulous standard of social desirability - like
promoting "justice" 155 or avoiding "immoral" projects 15 6 - for then
the lawyer must guess which standard of social desirability the tribunal will adopt in her case.
But even if the general standard stipulated some concrete measure
of social desirability - say Posnerian economic efficiency, Rawlsian
distributive justice, or the substantive norms underlying current law
- the risk of legal sanctions would remain. Lawyers' judgments
about whether their advice meets the stipulated standard of desirability will often be uncertain or prove inaccurate. Lawyers will have to
make predictions of how the advice will affect their client's behavior
and how a tribunal will judge the effects of their advice. The latter will
be particularly difficult because ex post adjudication of the desirability
of advice will be hard to predict and often inaccurate. The tribunal
will likely have incomplete information because often there will be no
physical evidence about, or disinterested witnesses to, the advice given.
Moreover, a general standard will exacerbate the risk of inaccuracy
because such a standard is more manipulable and heavily dependent in
application on contextual elements of the situation that may be poorly
captured in an ex post inquiry. Thus, even well-motivated and competent tribunals will often have a hard time reaching an accurate determination whether to sanction. 157 Such uncertainty will often lead
lawyers to forgo desirable advice for fear of legal sanctions.
154. William Simon, for example, anticipates that litigation counsel would ordinarily con·
duct such an assessment of the competence of the opponent and the tribunal before giving litigation advice. See Simon, supra note 1, at 1100 (suggesting that the lawyer has an obligation to
assess the risk of institutional failure). Similarly, David Wilkins argues that Kaye, Scholer had
an obligation to assess whether the effectiveness of its opponent, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, had been impaired by "political pressures," and, if it detected such an impairment, to
moderate its advocacy accordingly. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1194-95.
155. Id. at 1090.
156. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 160-61.
157. Cf. Kraakman, supra note 33, at 73 ("Equally important, both courts and gatekeepers
are likely to err in rough proportion to the complexity of misconduct or the ambiguity of the
law.").
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Infrequent detection of prohibited advice may worsen the problem
of overdeterrence. Infrequent detection is likely for several reasons.
Accurate information requires full monitoring of lawyers' activities,
including their interactions with clients, a prohibitively costly enterprise.158 Even if there were no formal rules requiring attorneys to
keep silent about their clients' affairs, 159 few cases of wrongdoing
would be reported. If the lawyer has provided advice that prevents
desirable conduct, the matter will often never come to light. If the
lawyer has given advice that encourages undesirable conduct, neither
lawyer nor client have any incentive to say anything unless the client
actually engages in the harmful activity, is caught, and concludes that
the advantages of attacking the lawyer exceed the advantages of making common cause with him. 160 Even if this occurs, the lawyer's
greater legal sophistication may often allow him to obscure what actually took place or to dominate a "swearing match" with the client.
Infrequent detection and inaccurate adjudication combine to create a difficult problem of sanctioning policy. Infrequent detection
might seem to call for severe, perhaps even career-threatening, sanctions in cases where improper advice is detected. 161 But, given the
inaccuracy of adjudication under a general standard of social desirability, this approach will potentially subject a great deal of desirable advice to very severe sanctions.
The problem of overdeterrence under a general standard would operate across the full spectrum of advice, but its extent would vary depending on the kinds of lawyers, clients, and legal issues involved.
158. Obviously monitoring would be very costly simply as a matter of information gathering.
The cost would be greater, of course, to the extent that monitoring also violated basic privacy
values or deterred desirable advice. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Full analysis of
confidentiality rules is beyond the scope of our present discussion except to note that, under an
open-textured standard, even full information about the interaction between lawyer and client
would not eliminate the risk of mistaken sanctioning. For an analysis of confidentiality in litigation, see Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 401-13.
159. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (forbidding disclosure of information "relating to the representation").
160. See Wilkins, supra note 153, at 834 (noting that the client seldom has incentive to tum
in its "partner in crime"). Professor Wilkins' analysis of the question of who should exercise
regulatory authority over lawyers echoes many of the themes explored here, particularly the
different effects of lawyer regulation designed to curb excesses of lawyer zeal on different classes
of clients. But his analysis does not focus on the issue as it arises in the context of formulating
rules for the provision oflegal advice because he assumes that different regulatory authorities will
generally enforce the same set of rules. His analysis of the Kaye, Scholer matter, however, expressly considers the relevance of client type to the content of professional regulation. Wilkins,
supra note 8, at 1206-09 (discussing how sophisticated clients can avoid overdeterrence).
161. For example, the remedy obtained in the Kaye, Scholer litigation barred two lawyers
from the firm from representing regulated savings and loan clients in perpetuity. In re Fishbein,
OTS AP-92-25 (Department of Treasury 1992) (order of prohibition and disbarment); In re
Katzman, OTS AP-92-26 (Department of Treasury 1992) (same).
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Where a significant possibility exists that lawyers would mistakenly be
assessed severe sanctions, lawyers who are risk averse or who have
high risk-bearing costs would be more severely deterred from giving
desirable advice. 162
Some clients would also experience greater overdeterrence than
others. Because increased compliance costs would make legal advice
more expensive, clients with less wealth would have to forgo more desirable advice, and thus suffer greater overdeterrence, than wealthier
clients. Clients unfamiliar to the lawyer are also likely to experience
greater overdeterrence. When a client is unfamiliar, the lawyer knows
less about what the client knows, how advice will influence the client's
conduct, and the benefits to the client of engaging in the conduct. Unfamiliar clients therefore increase both the costs of complying with a
general standard and the residual risk of being held liable even if one
has complied. Overdeterrence should therefore be less severe for clients whom the lawyer has represented before, whom he knows from
other social settings, or with whom he shares common traits or experiences. Overdeterrence will be more severe for clients who are onetime
users of the legal system or are of a different race or socioeconomic
background than the lawyer.163
One can also expect greater overdeterrence for clients who cannot
effectively bargain for advice, whether due to distress (so that they
lack the time and energy to shop for a lawyer), inexperience, or inability to offer repeat business. Such clients are less likely to recognize
when they have been denied desirable advice and less able to make
credible threats to take present or future business elsewhere. 164
Overdeterrence may be particularly severe if, as seems plausible, there
is a significant overlap between the universes of risk-averse lawyers,
less wealthy clients, unfamiliar clients, and clients who cannot bargain
for advice.
Overdeterrence is also more likely for certain types of legal issues.
Its impact is likely to be more severe for small-stakes claims or issues,
where increased compliance costs often dwarf the value of the advice.
Overdeterrence will also be greater when the lawfulness of the client's
162. See Jackson, supra note 53, at 1065 & n.67 (discussing risk aversion among lawyers).
163. See id. at 1056 & n.139 (risky savings and loans denied advice); Kraakman, supra note
33, at 77 (rejection of risky clients).
164. One should not think of this as simply a problem of agency costs that conflict of interest
rules can control. Recall that the decision to refuse a client or to withdraw from representation
on moral grounds is essentially discretionary. Overdeterrence may therefore be reflected not
primarily in failures to provide advice within a lawyer-client relationship, but rather in failures to
commence or continue relationships. Moreover, within relationships between lawyers and oneshot clients, conflict of interest rules are significantly underenforced, largely on account of low
rates of client detection. Wilkins, supra note 153, at 822-30.
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conduct is uncertain. Under standards framed in terms of justice or
social desirability, overdeterrence will also increase when the lawyer's
professional competence does not enable him to determine with confidence whether the client's conduct will be socially desirable. Classically the lawyer's legal training and experience equip her to determine
whether particular conduct is sanctionable and, sometimes, the level of
expected sanctions. When sanctionability or the level of. expected
sanctions are weak proxies for social desirability, that training is unlikely to provide her with any special advantage in evaluating the conduct. In general, we might expect a weak correlation between
sanctionability and social desirability when the applicable rules do not
seek to prohibit conduct outright, but rather to price conduct by making the actor internalize its social costs. 165 The desirability of such
conduct turns not on whether the conduct is sanctionable or on the
level of expected sanctions, but on whether its private and public benefits exceed its private and public costs, an issue on which the lawyer
may well doubt her competence.
The potential differential impact in deterring advice also has disturbing implications for the provision of advice with undesirable behavioral consequences that is nonetheless justified on fairness
grounds. 166 Consider first the class of cases in which fairness calls for
advice notwithstanding the risk that it will deter desirable conduct.
When the law is contested, or the legal rules price conduct rather than
prohibit it, actors will often face severe expected sanctions despite
their correct - or at least reasonable - belief that their proposed
conduct is socially desirable. As we have seen, however, those conditions also increase the likelihood of overdeterring advice under a general standard. Such a standard therefore increases the risk that actors
will be unfairly sanctioned for desirable conduct. That risk will be still
more grave for clients with limited resources, unfamiliar clients, and
clients who cannot effectively bargain for advice. The greater
overdeterrence of advice for those classes of clients may also create
troubling problems under the fair fight principle when such clients oppose parties who do not suffer from those disadvantages. 167
165. This distinction was apparently introduced to the law-and-economics literature by Robert Cooter. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). The
distinction has recently been strongly pressed in the recent work of John Coffee. See John C.
Coffee, Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 225-28 (1991) [hereinafter Coffee, Reflections];
John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models -And
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876 & n.6 (1992) (describing the distinction)
[hereinafter Coffee, Paradigms Lost].
166. See supra section III.A.
167. This problem arguably has arisen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, where
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Accordingly, proposals for a general standard condemning undesirable advice should have more appeal when clients are repeat players
who are familiar to their lawyers and, hence, run less risk of being
denied desirable advice on account of overdeterrence. Indeed,
although proponents of more general standards have not explicitly recognized this overdeterrence problem, their actual positions are consistent with our conclusions about the distribution of overdeterrence.
Thus, critics of the present regime of professional ethics strongly emphasize its overinclusiveness as applied to sophisticated business entities, 168 for whom overdeterrence is less problematic. And proponents
of more general standards often express reluctance to extend their approach to cases involving unfamiliar or unsophisticated clients, 169 for
whom we would predict greater overdeterrence. In short, the viability
(if any) of a general standard policing undesirable advice may depend
on limiting its application to settings in which all or most clients are
familiar, sophisticated repeat players with relatively large economic
stakes in the issues. Proceedings before federal regulatory agencies
like the SEC and OTS, where such standards have been proposed,
might arguably be such settings.11o
Specialized regulatory settings may also influence other undesirable effects of a general standard. First, if lawyers and regulators are
both genuinely expert in the underlying subject matter, that expertise
may reduce both the degree of uncertainty about how general standards should be interpreted and applied and the residual risk of error
in doing so. 171 Second, if such settings involve repeated interactions
among a well-defined community of lawyers and regulators, those interactions may over time generate relatively firm understandings about
the meaning and application of such standards. Third, such forums
may sometimes permit low cost increases in the rate of enforcement,
evidence suggests that sanctions directed at lawyers and litigants have deterred individual plain·
tiffs - and particularly civil rights plaintiffs - more severely than organizational defendants.
Lawrence Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 970-75
(1992).
168. See Rhode, supra note 127, at 607-08; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 109.
169. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 66 (suggesting that traditional notions of zealous advocacy
should apply for defendants in criminal cases and for parties in civil cases when the client is
much less powerful than his opponent); Simon, supra note I, at 1084 (limiting his approach to
civil practice and excluding criminal cases).
170. See Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1207 (arguing that savings and loan institutions are "so·
phisticated repeat users of legal services" who can protect themselves against costs associated
with defensive lawyering).
171. Cf. Kraakman, supra note 33, at 83 (arguing that the expertise of the securities bar and
underwriting community has helped to "focus" due diligence obligations under the federal securities laws).
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which in tum may make it possible to maintain deterrence while reducing actual sanctions toward the level of social harm, rather than
some multiple thereof. This should reduce overdeterrence due to risk
aversion or high risk-bearing costs.172
2. An Ethical Prohibition on Undesirable Advice
In lieu of a general legal prohibition on undesirable advice, some
critics suggest propounding a comparable
as ap. ethical norm,
drilled or socialized into lawyers during law school or by professional
associations and interactions. 173 Generally this is presented as a more
modest, and easier to justify, proposal than the legal reform just considered. Again, we put aside questions about practicality, such as
whether such socialization could be sufficiently effective to change
legal practice. Rather, we focus on the question whether, if effective,
such an ethical norm would have desirable consequences overall, or at
least more desirable consequences than a legally imposed standard.
Such proposals for a new ethical or professional norm of avoiding
undesirable advice must contemplate that socialization will overcome
the lure of legal fees in one of two ways. First, social sanctions, such
as professional disparagement, may coerce attorneys into complying
with the norm despite financial incentives to the contrary. Second,
legal education or professional training may instill the norm so deeply
into lawyers that they will comply ·automatically despite contrary financial incentives 174 or will experience sufficient internal rewards from
compliance (or guilt from violations) to overcome those financial incentives.175 Such ethical norms can be effective in accomplishing their
stated aim - namely denying advice when it would lead to undesirable consequences - only if lawyers complying with the ethical norm
have sufficient market power that clients seeking undesirable advice
cannot simply tum to alternative lawyers with lower or different ethical standards.
With regard to social sanctions, our analysis parallels that in the
last section. Like legal sanctions for undesirable advice, social standards will impose higher compliance costs, with disproportionate ef-

rule

172. Cf Jackson, supra note 53, at 1063-67 (discussing the relation between enforcement
rates, sanction levels, and overdeterrence).
173. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 9, at 158-59; Simon, supra note 1, at 1084 (presenting as an
alternative thesis that his proposed duty .to "do justice" could be incorporated into individual
ethical judgment rather than professional rules).
174. Cf Kornhauser, supra note 39.
175. See Ronald S. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Mo. L. REV. 869, 886-89 (1990) (arguing and collecting sources to support point that
lawyers can be motivated or socialized to choose virtue over income).
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fects on less wealthy, less familiar, and less sophisticated clients. Also
like legal sanctions, social sanctions will be uncertain and often imposed inaccurately. Indeed, social sanctions probably will be even
more nebulous than general legal standards, in part because social
judgments express no uniform rationale or binding precedent. Moreover, because social condemnation will often rest on superficial judgments and casual observation, the imposition of social sanctions is
more likely to be inaccurate even if the social norm were perfectly
specified. A familiar example is the fear that individuals who have
been judged guilty by the media would find it difficult to secure counsel. If the fear of social sanctions can overcome the desire for income
sufficiently to deter undesirable advice, that same fear of social sanctions would also deter lawyers from giving many forms of advice that
would in fact be desirable.
Distributional problems will also accompany social sanctions
applied by members of the profession. Not only will the unfamiliar,
one-shot client seem more risky to the advising lawyer (and more
costly to investigate), but those same characteristics are also likely to
make the client unfamiliar to the members of the profession generally,
thus decreasing the accuracy of the social sanctioning process. One
might thus expect professional social sanctions disproportionately to
overdeter advice to clients who come from a different socioeconomic
background than their lawyers or who have one-shot or nonroutine
claims. 176
Social sanctions, however, do have at least one potential advantage
over legally enforced sanctions: social interactions may be more likely
than legal rules to detect and punish the giving of undesirable advice.
In practice settings where lawyers interact frequently and reputational
networks are strong, a lawyer may fear the condemnation of legal
peers who can observe his behavior far more than the unlikely prospect of a disciplinary hearing. This greater ease of detection can make
social sanctions more effective, even though far less severe when imposed, than legal sanctions. We thus do not argue that social sanctions are in any sense an inferior means of regulating undesirable
forms of advice - just that they raise problems of overdeterrence similar to those raised by legal sanctions.
Internalized professional norms present a more mixed picture.
Under this approach, the well-socialized lawyer will be self-monitoring
176. Indeed, some have criticized professional rules regulating legal advertising or soliciting
clients, acquiring an interest in litigation, and fee divisions among lawyers as intended to deter
selectively advice that increases the likelihood of claims by personal injury, consumer, or civil
rights plaintiffs. See supra note 149. Such clients tend to be one-shot and often unfamiliar.
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and self-sanctioning, which reduces overdeterrence problems stemming from low detection rates and inaccurate sanctioning. Compliance costs should, however, continue to overdeter desirable advice,
both generally and with respect to less wealthy, less familiar, and less
experienced clients.
The open-textured nature of the standard, however, may mean
that underdeterrence is not effectively corrected for clients who can
shop for advice. To understand this observation, we must focus on
what sort of norm, precisely, would be instilled. Suppose, for example,
the norm is quite general and standardlike, requiring that each lawyer
balance his client's interests against the interests of others or achieve
the most just result in each case. 177 Even well-socialized, conscientious lawyers applying such an open-ended norm will have a high error rate around the mean of social desirability. Accordingly, clients
who can shop for advice will often obtain the advice they want by
picking another lawyer or law firm when the first denies them advice.
Moreover, to the extent such a standard invites lawyers to make their
own moral judgments without reference to external standards of social
desirability, different lawyers attempting to comply with the standard
will (accurately!) reach sharply different conclusions, thus increasing
sophisticated clients' ability to shop for the advice they want. The de
facto sti!ndard is, in short, likely to vary too much to be effective.
Moreover, the inevitable tendency for self-interest to cloud factual and
moral judgment will likely induce lawyers to underestimate the undesirability of advice, particularly as they see business migrate to those
with laxer ethical standards.
Effective internalized ethical norms, then, must have sufficiently
uniform content and application that clients lack ready alternatives.
Since internal moral adjudication is private and decentralized, such
uniformity can only be achieved if the instilled norms are rulelike,
having broad, relatively precise application. Such rulelike internalized
norms might resist the race to the ethical bottom. But, because they
must be framed broadly, they raise inevitable problems of over- and
underinclusion, and thus over- and underdeterrence, because they
would not allow for contextual moral judgment.
As a more modest strategy a law firm might endeavor to exploit its
own market power to cease providing certain clients with undesirable
advice under an ethical norm particular to that firm. Law firms are
normally too small to have market power in any general legal market.
But, as Ronald Gilson has argued, often law firms do have market
177. See generally Simon, supra note l (proposing that lawyers act to promote justice.).
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power vis-a-vis certain clients because those clients have made relationship-specific investments in that firm. 178 Such relationship-specific
investments will make it costly for long-term clients to switch firms
and thus gives firms some marginal market power to withhold desirable advice without losing their clients.
But a strategy based on single-firm market power faces four severe
problems. First, in the long run a firm that pursues such a strategy
will have difficulty acquiring new clients and will tend to lose business
to other expanding firms. Second, as Gilson himself has noted, the
increasing legal sophistication of long-term business clients, in part because of the expanding role of general counsel, has given clients
greater ability to shop effectively, reducing the availability of this strategy.179 Third, because the strategy depends on repeat players, it is not
feasible in markets dominated by one-shot clients. Finally, unless the
firm can afford to lose the business of all clients against whom it lacks
market power (new or sophisticated or one-shot clients), successfully
pursuing this strategy would require distinguishing between these clients subject to the firm's market power (locked-in, unsophisticated,
repeat playing clients) and those who are not, and then applying different ethical norms to each set of clients. 180 Both distinguishing clients
and especially applying dichotomous ethical norms are likely to prove
difficult in practice. They may also give rise to new ethical problems
stemming from the perceived need to prevent clients from learning of
the alternate ethical standard.1s 1
At the same time that it seems unlikely to deter advice to clients
who can shop, a fully effective, open-textured ethical standard poses
new risks of reducing desirable advice to unsophisticated or one-shot
clients. The risks arise from the interaction of any ethical norm with
the law of legal malpractice, which poses an interesting dilemma. 182
Suppose, first, that compliance with a proposed ethical standard would
not be a defense to a client's malpractice claim that she was denied
legal advice. Such a rule would render the ethical standard all but a
dead letter. Lawyers who otherwise would deny lawful advice to clients on ethical grounds will not persist when threatened with malpractice liability.
178. See Gilsop, supra note 175, at 889-98.
179. See id. at 900-03.
180. Cf. 10 PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW~ 1740 (forthcoming 1994).
181. Cf. Mark Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV, L.
REV. 2009, 2016-17 (1990) (suggesting that lawyers practicing under a general standard would
have to deceive clients).
182. Much of the argument here also applies to the interaction of legal malpractice liability
with a professional code that attempts to require lawyers to deny undesirable advice.
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Alternatively, suppose that complying with the proposed ethical
norm would be a defense to a malpractice claim. In that event, the
ethical norm could seriously undermine the standard of care in providing advice mandated by the law of legal malpractice. The lawyer who
failed to provide advice out of sloppiness could simply attribute the
failure to misgivings about whether the advice would lead to socially
undesirable consequences. Of course a tribunal might reject the lawyer's judgment as unreasonable, but then judges and juries in malpractice cases, rather than socialization and internal sanctioning
mechanisms, would establish the effective standard of practice, reintroducing all the problems of over- and underdeterrence that attend ex
post adjudication of a legal prohibition on undesirable advice. 183
Undermining the effective legal standard of care under malpractice
law will have a different effect on different clients. For the sophisticated, repeat-playing client, one doubts that the legal standard of care
has much impact at all. Lawyers' interest in preserving their reputation for good legal work should provide a sufficient incentive for them
to take care. But shoddy work done for unsophisticated, one-shot clients by definition has no impact on future business with the client and
will likely have little impact on the lawyer's general reputation either.
Again, the distributional impact of the advice forgone - through increased cost, deterrence, or sloppiness - seems likely to impact unsophisticated or one-shot clients disproportionately.1s 4
3.

The Triggering Functlon of the Traditional Crime-Fraud Line

The disadvantages of a general legal or ethical standard seem to us
to provide ample ground for a rule of bright-line legality for substantial categories of advice, at least for unfamiliar or one-shot clients.
The question remains why traditional professional norms draw the
rule of bright-line legality just shy of known fraud or crime, rather
183. This will be largely true even if the tribunals apply the subjective test, limiting their
inquiry to whether the lawyer in fact thought the advice was undesirable. Absent a smoking gun
- such as the lawyer's own admission - subjective intents must be determined by inferences
that are inevitably based on some implicit understanding of what a reasonable person would have
thought under the circumstances.
184. Very recent work by Luban and Simon shows an emerging awareness of the potential
effects of a discretionary ethical standard on the quality of representation provided to unsophisticated, powerless parties. It also documents a divergence of their views concerning the severity of
such effects. Compare David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1757-59 (1993) (arguing that a discretionary ethical standard for "aggressive advocacy" in criminal cases should be rejected because it would encourage incompetent practice) with William H.
Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1767,
1769-71 (1993) (discounting that risk). In this exchange, as in earlier work, neither author devotes any attention to the problems of overdeterrence that might result if their proposed standards were embodied in legal norms enforced through coercive sanctions.
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than at some other point. In our view, that choice appears most plausible on the assumption that the crime-fraud line accurately distinguishes those laws that, because they are narrowly drawn around the
most egregious conduct, that are relatively less overinclusive and relatively more worrisome in terms of underdeterrence. 185
If crimes and frauds substantially exhaust the categories of laws
that are narrowly drawn around highly undesirable behavior, then
seeking to prohibit advice that facilitates undesirable conduct outside
those categories runs a severe risk of overdeterring advice justifiable on
behavioral or fairness grounds. For it would follow that, outside that
category, overinclusion and overdeterrence present greater problems.
The assumption that crime and fraud laws are relatively less overinclusive also helps to justify the more complex and open-textured rule
governing the provision of advice about known crimes or frauds. Recall that, under this rule, advice that the conduct is unlawful is clearly
permitted, but other types of advice are shadowed by uncertainty concerning the boundary between permitted analysis and prohibited
assistance. 186 If contemplated criminal or fraudulent conduct is almost always undesirable, advice that it is sanctionable will seldom
have undesirable behavioral effects. After all, such advice should stop
normally law-abiding clients in their tracks, regardless of the level of
expected sanctions. Even if clients are not law abiding, learning that
their proposed conduct is criminal or fraudulent will never increase
the likelihood that they will engage in it. The severity of the criminal
sanction, moreover, provides compelling fairness reasons for providing
such advice. Conversely if crimes and frauds (and conduct bordering
on them) are almost always undesirable, there is no social value in and rarely any fairness argument for - advice that allows parties to
lower expected sanctions. A complete prohibition seems appropriate.
On the assumption that crime and fraud laws exhibit low overinclusion, the indeterminate status of intermediate kinds of advice, such
as advice about the level of expected sanctions, also seems appropriate.
Granted, such advice can be socially desirable when the client underestimates expected sanctions. But, in most other respects, it appears
uniquely dangerous. A client who expresses interest in the level of
expected sanctions for conduct he already knows to be criminal or
185. See Parker, supra note 32, at 759·60 nn.51-56 (collecting sources holding the view that
criminal behavior is particularly valueless with little surrounding productive behavior to be
overdeterred). Many believe that this is how the criminal law should operate. Coffee, Paradigms
Lost, supra note 165, at 1876 (arguing that the criminal law should be limited to prohibiting
conduct that society believes "lacks any social utility"). Whether it now does so in fact is more
doubtful. See id. at 1878-82.
186. See supra notes 131-36 and accompa~ying text.
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fraudulent is unlikely to be law abiding. Thus, if the client overestimates expected sanctions, advice will strongly increase the likelihood
of undesirable conduct. And, because advice about the scope of sanctions should provide full notice that the conduct is wrongful, there is
no independent fairness justification for advice about the level of
sanctions.
It may therefore be appropriate to regulate advice about expected
sanctions for known crime or fraud under a probabilistic standard,
permitting such advice when it corrects underestimations of expected
sanctions, but forbidding it when it corrects overestimations. The risk
that such a standard will deter desirable advice is lower because, given
the situation, less advice is desirable. Moreover, the risk of selectively
overdeterring desirable advice to unfamiliar or unsophisticated clients
is less, both because a client's continued interest in the level of expected sanctions provides important confirmation of her character and
because determining the social desirability of the client's conduct no
longer depends on a costly and potentially erroneous inquiry into the
level of benefit to her.
On this account, the structure of the rules on advice adopts what
one of us has elsewhere described as a "triggering" approach. 187 A
triggering approach is often a useful regulatory strategy when there
are two alternative legal doctrines: one that exhibits less underdeterrence at the expense of greater overdeterrence, and another that exhibits less overdeterrence at the expense of greater underdeterrence. The
former doctrine would be better if underdeterrence problems
predominate; the latter would be better if overdeterrence problems
predominate. Rather than simply choosing one of the doctrines to apply in all cases, however, sometimes the law can apply each doctrine
selectively by employing a metarule to segregate the general class of
cases into one class in which underdeterrence problems dominate and
another class in which overdeterrence problems dominate. That
metarule would then trigger the application of the first doctrine to the
first class of cases and the second doctrine to the second class. Each
doctrine would accordingly be focused on the sorts of cases in which
its mix of under- and overdeterrence is most appropriate, which may
optimize overall over- and underdeterrence better than any single doctrine could.
Here, the metarule rests on the presence or absence of known criminal or fraudulent activity. Where there is known criminal or fraudu187. Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function ofSale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1465 (1992).
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lent activity, this metarule "triggers" what is in effect a general
standard to police undesirable advice about the level of expected sanctions. Although such a general standard has the serious overdeterrence problems we raised above, it does reduce underdeterrence of
undesirable advice. It is thus particularly well suited for a class of
cases in which underdeterrence problems predominate, which by hypothesis are the cases triggered by the crime-fraud rule. Outside of the
crime-fraud area, overdeterrence concerns become far more serious,
and underdeterrence concerns less serious. There, the traditional permission of advice, which reduces overdeterrence of desirable advice at
the expense of underdeterring undesirable advice, may be more appropriate. Arguably, this triggering approach can minimize the overall
harm from the overdeterrence of desirable advice and underdeterrence
of undesirable advice more effectively than applying in all cases either
a rule of permission or a general standard prohibiting undesirable
advice.
The ultimate plausibility and wisdom of this account as a guide to
policymaking depends critically on the underlying assumptions. If the
categories of crime and fraud exclude many laws that have little overinclusion or overdeterrence, the current bright-line rules of legality
may significantly underdeter undesirable advice. Critics of the traditional rules clearly believe this is a significant problem. 188
Cutting the other way, however, is the present expansion of criminal law to cover less egregious forms of misconduct and to "price"
conduct that has substantial social benefits. 189 This expansion suggests that, in many cases, advice that corrects overestimations of criminal sanctions, even for known criminal conduct, may have substantial
social value because the conduct is itself desirable. The social value of
the advice is likely to be even higher for conduct bordering on criminal
188. Thus, in discussing corporate counsel's responsibilities in the Ford Pinto case, David
Luban argues that "it can make no difference whether or not Ford's actions in the Pinto situation
violated a criminal statute: it is the actions themselves rather than their legal classification that
give rise to the need for whistleblowing." See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 215; see also Simon, supra
note 1, at 1127 (arguing in support of his "discretionary" approach that categorical norms "tend
to be both overinclusive and underinclusive relative to their purposes").
Not surprisingly, defenders of the traditional approach point to cases in which non-criminal
regulation prohibits desirable conduct. See, e.g., John K. Villa, Emerging Theories of Liability
for Lending Counsel, in THE ATTORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 55, at 93, 153-55
(describing cases in which conduct violating regulations governing loan underwriting may be
socially desirable).
189. See Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 165, at 1878-82 (discussing criminalization of
common law of breach offiduciary duty, growth of vicarious liability, and proliferation of federal
regulations with potential criminal penalties); Coffee, Reflections, supra note 165, at 208-09
(describing criminalization of breach of contract); id. at 228-29 ("The negligent [crill)inal] de·
fendant is frequently engaged in activities that have social utility and, indeed, is the same person
with whom the Jaw of torts regularly deals.").
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behavior that might be mistaken for it. The expansion of criminal law
also suggests that fairness considerations may increasingly justify advice that corrects underestimations of expected sanctions for such conduct because actors may correctly believe that such conduct is socially
desirable. In either instance, the standard governing the provision of
advice about criminal conduct may increasingly overdeter desirable
advice. 19° Critics of current professional rules have neglected this risk.
IV.

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SANCTIONS AND ACOUSTIC
SEPARATION

Those familiar with Meir Dan-Cohen's analysis of acoustic separation may find it odd that we bring it up in this article. After all, DanCohen's work is a piece of jurisprudence, not rational actor modeling.
But, reconsidered in light of the preceding analysis, his acoustic separation argument in fact can be mined for several insights into general
questions about the desirability of encouraging or discouraging the
dissemination of knowledge about legal sanctions.
A. Dan-Cohen's Analysis
Dan-Cohen begins with a well-established jurisprudential distinction: that between conduct rules and decision rules. 191 Conduct rules
are legal rules directed at the general public and intended to guide its
conduct. Decision rules are legal rules directed at government officials
and intended to guide their adjudication of the public's conduct.
One might think this distinction has little practical significance.
Conduct rules that define illegal conduct and its penalty would necessarily seem to imply a parallel decision rule: that officials should apply
that conduct rule and impose the penalty it provides on violations
thereof. Conversely, a decision rule that officials should condemn and
punish certain behavior appears to imply a parallel conduct rule: that
individuals should avoid such behavior or suffer the penalty the decision rule authorizes. But, Dan-Cohen argues, this parallel is not compelled logically, empirically, or normatively.
Logically, the judge who applies, for example, the rule forbidding
theft is not bound by the conduct rule that prohibits theft; failing to
impose the proper penalty on theft does not itself constitute theft. 192
The judge is bound rather by a decision rule for imposing punishment,
190. Indeed, if the phenomenon of criminal sanctions for conduct with some social value
were to become sufficiently widespread, even a prohibition on assisting such conduct might sweep
too broadly.
191. Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 625-30.
192. Id. at 628.
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one element of which may be the conduct rule defining theft. Imagine,
then, that adjudicators and the general public are separated into different acoustically sealed chambers. In that event the legal regime could
communicate decision rules to adjudicators without those rules being
overheard (and turned into conduct rules) by the general public. 193
Decision rules need not logically be the same as conduct rules.
Empirically, of course, conditions of complete acoustic separation
hardly ever exist. The general public does hear about adjudicative decisions. But, Dan-Cohen argues, often conditions of partial acoustic
separation do exist. 194 The general public may have difficulty grasping, or find it too costly to learn, the complex decision rules that are
directed at adjudicators and may thus rely on the more simple conduct
rules directed at the general public. Moreover, sometimes the legal
regime can, perhaps not intentionally, employ a strategy of selective
transmission, which furthers or protects the acoustic separation between conduct rules and decision rules. These strategies include misleading maxims, legal vagueness and complexity, giving technical legal
meanings to ordinary words, and denying defenses to those likely to
have or obtain legal sophistication before acting.19 5
One example of this selective transmission appeared in the introduction to this article. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse" is the simple but misleading maxim of conduct disseminated to the general
public; the actual decision rule involves a complex set of conflicting
factors weighing for and against allowing the defense. 196 The very
simplicity of the maxim, compared to the complexity of the factors,
makes it likely that partial acoustic separation can exist between the
conduct rule reflected in the maxim and the decision rule reflected in
the complex of factors.
Another example, Dan-Cohen argues, lies in the defenses of duress
or necessity. 197 These defenses are so vague and complex that the average citizen cannot understand or rely on them. Thus the general
public tends to be guided by a conduct rule that corresponds to the
legal violations shorn of these defenses, while the defenses do form
193. Id. at 630.
194. Id. at 634.
195. Id. at 639-40, 648, 652. Another strategy might be to prevent lawyers from learning the
information in the first place. In the past, for example, the Internal Revenue Service did not
make private revenue rulings or internal auditing standards publicly available. And, arguably
the published antitrust merger guidelines were stricter than the actual practice of the Department
of Justice's Antitrust Division during the Reagan Administration. Of course, such strategies put
a premium on hiring ex-IRS agents, or ex-lawyers from the Antitrust Division, as accountants or
lawyers. We are indebted to Walter Blum for this point.
196. Id. at 645-48.
197. Id. at 639-45.
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part of the decision rule used by courts. Moreover, courts tend to
deny the defenses to individuals who have special legal sophistication
or are in circumstances that lend themselves to prolonged deliberation
over, and perhaps obtaining advice concerning, the legal consequences
of contemplated conduct. This occurs, Dan-Cohen argues, because
there is little acoustic separation in these cases and thus no way to
effectively keep the conduct and decision rules distinct.
Normatively, is such selective transmission desirable? Not always,
Dan-Cohen concedes, but the conclusion that decision rules and conduct rules should be identical is not always normatively compelled
either. Instead, the matter must be decided in each area in accord
with the policies and values that seem relevant. 198 Consider, for example, selective transmission regarding the defenses of duress and necessity. Obscuring these defenses from conduct rules, Dan-Cohen argues,
can have beneficial behavioral effects: it helps ensure that individuals
commit legal violations only when they truly think the alternatives are
worse than the legal penalties. 199 But allowing these defenses in decision rules avoids the unfairness or harshness of punishing behavior
that was compelled by circumstances beyond the actor's control. 200
Without acoustic separation and selective transmission, the law must
choose between good behavioral effects and fairness in adjudication.
With them, the law can have both. Therefore, Dan-Cohen concludes,
it is far from obvious that selective transmission is normatively
undesirable. 2o 1
B. Acoustic Separation in Our Model
Dan-Cohen sums up his analysis as follows: "[W]e may expect the
law to engage in selective transmission (1) under conditions of partial
acoustic separation, and (2) in pursuit of policies that are best served
by decision rules that differ from the corresponding conduct rules." 202
We can use our framework to specify, generalize, and then extend
these conclusions.
In all of Dan-Cohen's examples of partial acoustic separation, the
conduct rules transmitted to the public exaggerate the scope of criminal conduct by omitting or obscuring defenses or limitations. We can
thus rephrase his first condition more specifically as "(1) individuals
overestimate the scope of conduct subject to criminal sanctions." Fur198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 629, 634.
Id. at 633, 638.
Id. at 633-34, 637.
See generally id. at 665-77 (assessing the legitimacy of selective transmission).
Id. at 636.
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ther, in all the examples meeting his second condition, the decision
rules are more lax than the conduct rules that would optimize behavior. We can thus rephrase this second condition more specifically as
"(2) the scope of conduct subject to criminal sanctions is narrower
than would, if known, optimize behavior."203 If these two conditions
are met, then it may be desirable for society to promote good behavior
by employing a strategy of selective transmission: that is, by diminishing the knowledge citizens possess about legal sanctions. Curbing
legal advice, the strategy we have focused on until now, is one way of
furthering this acoustic separation. But the other methods Dan-Cohen cites - such as vagueness, complexity, misleading maxims, and
giving technical definitions to ordinary words are other
possibilities.
Our framework further suggests two immediate ways to generalize
Dan-Cohen's claims. First, the conclusion applies to civil conduct as
well as criminal. Second, the conclusion applies to overestimations of
the level as well as scope of expected sanctions. Thus we may generalize as follows. If (1) persons overestimate expected sanctions
(whether because they exaggerate the scope of criminal conduct or
some other reason); and (2) the actual level of expected sanctions, if
known, would offer less than optimal deterrence (whether because of
the defenses and limitations contained in decision rules to pursue
nondeterrence goals or some other reason), then a strategy of diminishing knowledge about legal sanctions (such as curbing legal advice)
may be desirable to prevent the overestimations from being corrected.
This generalization would suggest, for example, that, in addition to
communicating simple harsh conduct rules and obscuring the substantive defenses, the law might (as long as acoustic separation exists)
profitably pursue a strategy of selective transmission by threatening
long prison terms for conduct even though the legal regime in fact
ameliorates those sentences with a complex regime of judicial discretion and probationary releases.
We may further use our framework to specify the circumstances in
which the behavioral consequences of such efforts to diminish knowledge about legal sanctions will in fact be desirable. 204 Namely, when203. Dan-Cohen emphasizes that decision rules might be narrower than behaviorally optimal
rules because of nonbehavioral goals such as fairness in adjudication or limiting the discretion of
adjudicators. Id. at 633-34, 648, 650-51, 661-64. While our model includes such nonbehavioral
goals, we also recognize that decision rules may be narrower than behaviorally optimal for a host
of other reasons as well. See supra section I.B.2.
204. Whether the resulting improvements in behavior will justify the use of selective transmission, in this or any other case, also depends on the fairness of allowing some actors to proceed
in ignorance. See supra section III.A and infra text accompanying and following notes 207-09.
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ever condition (3) is met: "The socially desirable overestimations of
sanctions for undesirable conduct outweigh (on whatever normative
scale one wishes to apply) the socially undesirable overestimations of
sanctions for desirable conduct. " 205 This condition might be met because potential undesirable actors make more errors or larger errors of
overestimation than potential desirable actors. Or it might be met because the undesirable conduct encouraged by full advice tends to do
more harm than· the desirable conduct encouraged by advice does
good.
Unless overestimations of sanctions for desirable and undesirable
conduct systemically differ, this third condition should generally follow from the second condition that sanctions are lower than those that
would optimize behavior if fully known. 206 This is because, starting
from such below optimal sanctions, an actual increase in expected
sanctions for both undesirable and desirable conduct would, by definition, have behavioral effects that are, on balance, socially beneficial. A
perceived increase in expected sanctions should have similar behavioral
effects, as long as the overestimations exhibit no systemic divergence.
Our framework also suggests two extensions to Dan-Cohen's
claims. First, the analysis applies to underestimations as well as overestimations. Thus, the behavioral consequences of a strategy of selective transmission (such as curbing legal advice) should be socially
desirable if (1) persons underestimate expected sanctions, (2) the actual level of expected sanctions is excessively high, and (3) the underestimations for desirable conduct outweigh the underestimations for
undesirable conduct. As in the last paragraph, the third condition
should generally follow from the second.
For example, consider antitrust liability for joint ventures. Suppose that the level of expected sanctions for joint ventures is too high.
Suppose, further, that businesses would be unaware of this potential
liability without legal advice. They would, in other words, underestimate expected sanctions. Under these facts, a curb on antitrust advice
might have desirable behavioral effects because such advice would discourage more desirable joint ventures than undesirable joint ventures.
The second extension involves cases in which over- and underestimations coexist and systemically diverge. Thus, the behavioral conse205. Dan-Cohen expressly recognizes this point with respect to overestimations of sanctions
for criminal conduct. Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 638 & n.29 ("The law's traditional resistance
to allowing the defenses considered here in any but the most extreme cases may be understood to
imply a belief that the benefits foregone because of overdeterrence in this area are more than
offset by the danger of reduced obedience to the law that allowing these defenses would bring
about.").
206. See supra section 11.B.
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quences of selective transmission will be desirable if (1) persons
overestimate expected sanctions for undesirable conduct and underestimate them for desirable conduct, and (2) the actual level of expected
sanctions does not perfectly deter the conduct under consideration.
Suppose, for example, unadvised individuals would both exaggerate
the odds of being caught for insider trading and understate the odds of
being held liable for trading when they had no inside information. In
such a scenario, improving knowledge about legal sanctions can only
worsen their behavior.
This last scenario, while perhaps rarer, provides when applicable
the most sweeping justification for selective transmission because it
should improve behavior even if fully disclosed sanctions would optimize behavior. Indeed, if selective transmission can be used in such a
scenario, it will often be possible to improve behavior even further by
adjusting sanctions away from the levels that would be optimal without selective transmission. Suppose, for example, that in the insider
trading example the optimal sanction would, if known, equal the
trader's stock profits given actual under- and oversanctioning. If with
selective transmission insider traders would overestimate sanctions
and innocent traders would underestimate them, then coupling selective transmission with an increase in actual sanctions to some multiple
of trading profits may further optimize behavior. This is because the
combination of selective transmission with such a sanction multiplier
can reduce underdeterrence but still keep overdeterrence below the
level that would be optimal if individuals accurately estimated
sanctions.
All this might suggest that advice or knowledge about legal sanctions is far less justifiable than our prior argument would indicate. After all, in any of the above three scenarios, advice or knowledge about
sanctions will have socially undesirable behavioral effects. This observation may tempt one to conclude that, at least for those areas of law
where legal sanctions do not optimize behavior, we should discourage
advice or knowledge about those legal sanctions.
This conclusion would, however, be premature. To begin, even
when selective transmission strategies have clearly desirable behavioral effects, they may face strong fairness objections. From a fairness
perspective, the least problematic scenario is that analyzed by DanCohen, in which behavioral improvements result from preserving
overestimations of sanctions for undesirable conduct. 207 As argued
above, it is difficult to describe a persuasive principle of fairness which
207. See supra section IV.A.
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requires informing a potential bad actor that he can get away with
misconduct. 208 The fair notice claim to advice will be particularly
weak if, as in Dan-Cohen's account, the use of selective transmission is
limited to the criminal law. Hence, in the first scenario, actors would
have a meritorious fairness claim to advice only in those relatively rare
instances when the fair fight principle applies. 2 09
However, the second and third scenarios raise more troubling fairness concerns. In the second scenario, selective transmission preserves
a state in which underestimations of excessive sanctions for desirable
conduct outweigh underestimations of sanctions for undesirable conduct. Because this strategy achieves its improvements in behavior by
keeping desirable actors in ignorance of the legal risks that they run, it
violates basic principles of fair notice. Some may regard this as a decisive objection to the use of this strategy.
In the third scenario, selective transmission achieves behavioral
improvements both (1) by failing to correct underestimations for desirable conduct, and (2) by failing to correct overestimations for undesirable conduct. The latter aspect ordinarily poses no fairness concerns.
The strength of the fairness objection to this strategy thus depends on
the extent to which it achieves its behavioral effects by failing to correct underestimations of sanctions for desirable conduct.
More fundamentally, each of the three scenarios in which selective
transmission can improve behavior has a mirror image in which advice
or knowledge about sanctions would clearly improve behavior. In the
mirror image of the first scenario, actors may underestimate insufficient sanctions instead of overestimating them. For example, they
might think that criminal penalties are much lower than they actually
are because of press coverage given to convicts released on parole.
In the mirror image of the second scenario, actors may overestimate excessive sanctions instead of underestimating them. They
might, for example, think that the probability and magnitude of punitive damage awards in product liability cases are far higher than they
actually are. This might result from extensive media coverage given
those few cases in which punitive damages are assessed or from the
media's tendency to give more coverage to high jury awards than to
the judicial decisions reducing those awards.
Finally, in the mirror image of the third scenario, people may underestimate sanctions for undesirable conduct and overestimate sanctions for desirable conduct. They might, for example, think both that
208. See supra section III.A.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
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the odds of being audited for an illegal deduction are lower than they
are, and that the odds of being audited for a lawful deduction are
higher than they are. In each of these alternative scenarios, selective
transmission will likely be undesirable and legal advice desirable.
Absent evidence that the three troublesome scenarios occur more
often than their opposites, advice and knowledge about sanctions must
be regarded as ambiguous (rather than undesirable) in cases when
sanctions, if known, would not optimize behavior. And, without such
evidence, curbs on advice or other strategies of selective transmission
must also be considered behaviorally ambiguous. In these behaviorally ambiguous scenarios, we think, fairness considerations will normally tip the balance in favor of full advice and knowledge.
The fact that the topic of legal knowledge concerns nonoptimal
sanctions thus does not alone suffice to justify a curb on the dissemination of legal knowledge about sanctions. Sometimes even knowledge
about nonoptimal sanctions can be desirable. Rather, efforts to diminish legal knowledge about nonoptimal sanctions, if justifiable at all,
must rest on careful, contextual assessments of the actual over- and
underestimations of the scope and level of expected sanctions that
would, given the topic at hand, be made by parties lacking advice or
knowledge about the applicable legal sanctions.
CONCLUSION

Ever since Adam and Eve, taking from the tree of knowledge has
sometimes had undesirable consequences. Knowledge about legal
sanctions is no exception. Advice or knowledge about legal sanctions
does not always have desirable behavioral effects even when sanctions
are set to optimize behavior. Instead, because of inevitable imprecisions in any sanctioning regime, advice or knowledge about optimal
sanctions often will have undesirable effects.
However, as elsewhere in life, there is good reason to think that,
despite some adverse consequences, more knowledge is on balance better. Unless the distribution of legal ignorance that would exist without
advice is skewed, the overall behavioral consequences of advice or
knowledge about sanctions will tend to be socially desirable if society
has set sanctions to optimize behavior. Furthermore, where sanctions
are set to optimize nonbehavioral measures of social welfare, advice
and knowledge about sanctions will have ambiguous behavioral consequences, but may be justifiable on fairness grounds.
Under our analysis, the desirability of legal counseling and litigation advice do not categorically differ. Both are prone to the same
mixed effects, and both should on balance be desirable if the applicable
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sanctions have been set to optimize behavior. Absent better empirical
evidence, we have no reason to conclude that the sanctions for primary conduct are any less optimal than the sanctions for litigation
conduct. And, without such evidence, nothing suggests that advice
about the sanctions applicable to primary conduct is any more or less
desirable than advice about the sanctions applicable to litigation
conduct.
A more tailored approach for curbing those forms of advice that
are likely to lead to undesirable consequences may be justifiable. But
open-ended efforts to screen out such undesirable advice, such as that
advocated by William Simon, are likely to face insuperable problems
of overdeterrence. They are, in other words, likely to screen out too
much desirable advice as well. The approach taken by current law,
targeting only those categories of advice that further known crimes or
frauds, better redresses the problem of underdeterred undesirable advice without excessively overdeterring desirable advice.
Finally, even when sanctions do not optimize behavior, it is not
true that advice or knowledge about sanctions is generally undesirable.
Sometimes the behavioral consequences will be undesirable, but other
times they will be desirable. Absent more particular evidence about
what exactly unadvised or ignorant parties would over- or underestimate, the overall behavioral effect of advice or knowledge about nonoptimal sanctions must be regarded as ambiguous. Given this
behavioral ambiguity, the fairness considerations in favor of legal advice are often controlling.

